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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. The Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, had subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case because the Petitioner- Appellant resided in that judicial district 
for three months prior to the commencement of the action, and the action involved dissolution of 
the marriage contract between the parties and the disposition of property and the maintenance of 
the parties. Utah Code Ann., §§ 30-3-1(2) and 30-3-5(1). 
B. The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over divorce matters pursuant 
to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
C. A Decree of Divorce was entered on January 15, 2002. An Amended Decree of 
Divorce was entered February 14, 2002. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal February 13, 
2002. 
D. The Amended Decree of Divorce was a final judgment. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether certain of the trial court's factual findings should be set aside. The 
standard of review is whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. D 'Aston v. 
D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Whether the trial court erred in valuing and dividing marital property. The 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Whether the trial court's valuation and division of marital property was supported 
by adequate factual findings. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 
P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Whether the trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to Appellee. The 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988). 
Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Appellee's rebuttal 
witness, Barbra Underhill. Counsel for Appellant made a timely objection to the admission of 
Ms. Underhill's testimony, which preserved the issue on appeal. Record on Appeal, at 257, lines 
12 -16; Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(l). The standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
State of Utah v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 
Utah Code Ann.§78-45-7(2) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26(a)(3)(A), (B) and (C) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 401, 402, 702, 703 and 705 
V, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action is to dissolve a second marriage between two professionally established 
individuals. The action presented issues regarding valuation of marital property, and permanent 
alimony award to Appellee. This appeal also presents issues regarding the trial court's 
admission of testimony by Appellee's surprise expert witness. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
A bench trial was held on October 29 and 30, 2001, in the present matter before the 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. Record 
on Appeal 318, pages 1 and 215. At the conclusion of trial, Judge Henriod took the matter 
under advisement. Record on Appeal, 318, page 283, In 10. On November 20, 2001, the trial 
court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Record on Appeal, 182. A Decree of 
Divorce was entered on January 15, 2002. Record on Appeal, 237. An Amended Decree of 
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Divorce was entered February 14, 2002. Record on Appeal, 260. Appellant filed a Notice of 
Appeal on February 13, 2002. Record on Appeal, 246. Pursuant to the stipulated motion 
extending time, the Brief of Appellant is due in this matter on September 5, 2002. Record on 
Appeal, 319. 
C. Disposition 
The trial court entered a Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Appellee were married on August 9, 1993. Record on Appeal, 213, TJ3. 
The parties had no children of their own. Id., 214, [^6. The parties separated January 11, 2001. 
Id., 214, TJ4. Appellee has a 17 year old son from a previous marriage, for whom she receives 
child support. Record on Appeal, 318, page 52, Ins 2 - 11, page 64, lines 14 - 15. 
A. Facts Relating to Marital Property Division and Valuation 
Appellant owned a Harley-Davidson motorcycle that he brought into the marriage. 
Record on Appeal, 20, ^|6. During the parties' marriage, or on November 7, 1998, Appellant 
ordered a new 2000 Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 318, page 37, Ins 10 -
11. When the motorcycle arrived in September, 1999, Appellant traded in his 1986 Harley-
Davidson motorcycle and received a credit of $9400, against the purchase price of $18,875.42. 
Record on Appeal, page 37, Ins 16 - 25; Petitioner's Exhibit 11. 
The trial court awarded the motorcycle to Appellant, along with the indebtedness thereon. 
Record on Appeal, 239 f 13, 240, ^27, 261, [^4. The trial court found the value of the motorcycle 
to be $19,000. Record on Appeal, 196,1J66, Petitioner's Exhibit 12. The trial court found the 
payoff on the motorcycle to be $5,452 and ordered the parties to share equally the $13,547.81 in 
equity. Id., fflf 67, 68 and 69. The trial court made no specific findings as to why the $19,000 
value was appropriate, or why it gave Appellant no credit for his premarital contribution 
regarding the motorcycle. 
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During the course of the marriage, Appellee purchased a 1995 Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 318, page 35, Ins 20-25. Appellee sold the motorcycle to a 
motorcycle dealer after the parties separated, for $9400. Record on Appeal, 318, page 36, Ins 1 
- 6, 195, TJ62. The trial court found that $9,400 was fair and reasonable compensation for 
Appellee's motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 195, ^ 63. The trial court ordered the parties to 
divide the sales proceeds from the motorcycle equally. Record on Appeal, 196, ffl[ 64 and 69. 
The trial court made no specific findings as to why the $9,400 value for Appellee's motorcycle 
was appropriate. 
During the course of the marriage, Appellant purchased a 1992 Ford F250 pick up truck. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 36, lines 23 -25. The trial court found the value of the truck to be 
$7,500. Record on Appeal, 196, If 70. The trial court awarded the truck to Appellant. Id. The 
trial court made no specific findings as to how it arrived at the $7,500 value for the truck. 
Prior to the date of the parties' marriage, Appellant accumulated construction tools worth 
thousands of dollars. Record on Appeal, 318, page 201, lines 9 - 14. During the marriage, 
Appellant bought a table saw for between $400 and $500. Record on Appeal, 318, page 108, 
lines 10 - 15. During the marriage, Appellee bought a diamond ring for $5000, Id, page 77, lines 
18 - 23. The diamond ring was valued at $4500 for insurance purposes. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 77, In 25, page 78, lines 1 - 9, Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Appellee sold the diamond ring to her 
mother for $500. Record on Appeal, 318, page 77, lines 18-21. Appellee referred to the 
6 
diamond ring as the "table saw ring" because she bought it in retaliation for Appellant's 
purchase of the table saw. Record on Appeal, 318, page 108, lines 4 - 12. The trial court found 
that there had not been enough detailed testimony regarding the value of the tools, which it noted 
that Appellee had alleged were equal to the value of the diamond ring. Record on Appeal, 198, ^ 
79. The trial court found that Appellee had paid $2,400 for the ring and that the $500 sales price 
was less than its actual value. Record on Appeal, 198, fflf 77 and 78.. The trial court made no 
specific findings as to the value of the diamond ring or the table saw and did not credit Appellant 
with the value of any premarital tools. 
B. Facts Relating to Permanent Alimony 
Appellee is employed as the office manager for Red Rock Brewing Company. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 42, lines 4 - 9 . The trial court found that Appellee had fair and reasonable 
living expenses of $3,519.30. Record on Appeal, 198, f 81, Petitioner's Exhibit 21. The trial 
court found that Appellee had a net monthly income of $2,218.66. Record on Appeal, 200, Tf 
91, Petitioner's Exhibit 21. The trial court found that Appellee had a shortfall of $1,300.64, 
between her net income and her needs. Record on Appeal, 202, <[f 107. The trial court found that 
Appellee had therefore established a need for alimony. Record on Appeal, 202, % 108. 
Included in Appellee's monthly living expenses was significant credit card debt incurred 
after the date of separation. Record on Appeal, 204, Tf 120. Petitioner's Exhibit 21. The trial 
court ordered Appellee to be solely responsible for those debts. Id. Also included in Appellee's 
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monthly living expenses was a debt to Linda Tobin for her half of the replacement cost of the 
marital home's carpet. Record on Appeal, 220, J 37, Petitioner's Exhibit 21. The trial court 
ordered Appellee to be solely responsible for that debt. Record on Appeal, 191, ^ 37. Also 
included in her monthly living expenses was a $200 lease payment for the new truck driven by 
her son, Jason, along with the costs of his food, gas, car insurance, housing, entertainment and 
private school. Petitioner's Exhibit 21. 
Appellant is employed as a firefighter. Record on Appeal, 318, page 130, lines 21 - 22. 
The trial court found that Appellant had living expenses of $2,576, after the sale of the marital 
home. Record on Appeal, 229, If 115, Respondent's Exhibit P. The trial court found that 
Appellee had a net monthly income of $3,170. Record on Appeal, 227, Tf 100. The trial court 
found that Appellee Appellant had an ability to pay Appellee alimony. Record on Appeal, 229, 
1117. 
The trial court excluded from Appellant's monthly living expenses the $250 monthly 
payment for the parties' Marriott timeshare and the $150 monthly payment for the parties' 
WorldMart timeshare, which the trial court awarded to Appellant, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon. Record on Appeal, 221, ^ 44. The trial court found that the timeshares had no market 
value. Id. The trial court made no specific findings as to why it was appropriate to eliminate the 
timeshare payments when they were not yet sold or transferred and had no market value. 
8 
C. Facts Relating to Rebuttal Witness Testimony 
Appellee was awarded the right to reside in the marital home with her son after the 
parties separated in January 2001. Record on Appeal 218, TJ30. Appellant paid both mortgages 
on the marital home until time of trial. Id., f32. Appellee resided in the marital home for six 
months and then vacated the residence on July 7, 2001. Id., ^33. Appellant resumed residency 
on July 11, 2001. Id. Appellant claimed the mortgage interest deduction and real property taxes 
on his 2000 income tax return. Respondent's Exhibit 18. 
The trial court allowed the testimony of a surprise rebuttal witness, Ms. Barbara 
Underhill, a certified public accountant, over Appellant's objections. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 257, lines 12 - 25, page 258, lines 1 - 5, page 259, In 25, page 260, lines 1 - 14. Appellant 
did not testify regarding the allocation of the mortgage interest deduction or real property taxes 
and his claim for business mileage during direct examination or cross. Appellee did not identify 
Ms. Underhill as a witness until the day before trial, did not identify her as an expert witness, did 
not provide a report regarding her expected testimony and did not qualify her as an expert. 
Nevertheless, the trial court allowed Ms. Underhill to opine on the mortgage interest deduction 
and property tax allocations, the consequences of Appellant not filing an amended tax return and 
Internal Revenue Service regulations regarding business mileage expenses. Record on Appeal, 
page 261, lines 4 - 25, page 262, lines 1-10. The trial court found that the parties were at an 
increased risk of audit and financial loss unless Appellant filed an amended return. Record on 
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Appeal 222, ^ f 57. The trial court awarded Appellee the right to claim one-half the mortgage 
interest deduction and real property taxes on the marital home for the 2000 income tax year and 
ordered Appellant to file an amended tax return. Record on Appeal, 239, j^ 12, 261, [^4. 
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was inequitable in valuing the parties' vehicles - using a price in excess of 
the purchase price and Appellee's estimate for Appellant's motorcycle and the high blue book 
price for Appellant's truck, while accepting the dealer purchase price for Appellee's motorcycle. 
The trial court failed to give Appellant credit for his premarital contribution to his motorcycle. 
The trial court failed to give Appellant credit for his premarital construction tools and refused to 
find a value for the one marital tool, a table saw, despite testimony as to its value. The trial 
court netted Appellant's tools it did not value, against Appellee's diamond ring, which it did not 
value and for which it used a clearly erroneous purchase price. The trial court failed to make 
adequate findings supporting the inequitable division and valuation of the personal property. 
The trial court's ruling regarding Appellee's post separation debt and her right to 
alimony are a poignant example of the trial court's ruling's plain error and internal 
inconsistency. As the facts marshaled below revealed, Appellee could have provided more for 
her own support by not running up her credit cards after the date of separation, after she sold 
everything at a garage sale. The trial court's order that Appellee pay her separate property debts 
incurred after the date of separation is antithetical to the trial court's other ruling that Appellant 
fund that expense. It is at least error and at most inequitable to order Appellant to underwrite 
Appellee's post separation extravagant purchases that the court awarded to her. Similarly, 
although the trial court ordered Appellee to be solely responsible for half the replacement cost of 
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the marital home's carpet, the trial court inexplicably includes that amount in calculating 
Appellant's alimony obligation. Appellee leased a new Ford Ranger truck for her 17 year old 
son. Appellee had the ability to provide a greater share of her own support by not leasing such 
an expensive vehicle or any vehicle at all for her son. Regardless, Appellant should not be 
obligated to support a child that is not his own, by paying for his transportation, private 
schooling, insurance, food, lodging and entertainment.. Finally, the trial court eliminated $400 
from Appellant's monthly living expenses because it assumed Appellant would dispose of the 
parties' two timeshares. Appellant was ordered to pay the monthly obligations thereon and it 
was error not to have included them in his monthly living expenses. 
The trial court allowed Appellee's surprise expert rebuttal witness to testify, over 
Appellant's objection. The trial court allowed testimony regarding the allocation of the 
mortgage interest deduction and property taxes on the marital home for the 2000 income tax year 
and Appellant's claim for business mileage expense - all issue that Appellant had not testified to 
on direct and Appellee had not raised in her case-in-chief or in cross examination. To the extent 
Ms. Underhill testified as a lay witness, Ms. Underhill's rebuttal testimony was outside the scope 
because Appellant did not testify regarding the allocation of the mortgage interest deduction or 
property taxes on direct examination. To the extent Ms. Underhill testified as an expert witness, 
her testimony was improperly admitted because Appellee did not disclose Ms. Underhill until 
the day of trial, did not designate her as an expert witness and the disclosure was not 
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accompanied by a written report. Had Appellant known that Ms. Underhill would be testifying 
regarding the issue of the mortgage interest deduction, he would have called the parties' former 
accountant to testify on his behalf and to present evidence that the accountant had advised 
Appellant that he could claim the entire deduction for the 2000 income tax year and justifying 
Appellant's right to claim it. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Evidence Does Not Support the Trial Court's Findings Regarding Marital 
Property. 
1. The Valuation of the 2000 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle 
The trial court was asked to value the parties' 2000 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, 
acquired during the marriage. The evidence apparently in support of the trial court's conclusion, 
included Petitioner's Exhibit 11, the Vehicle Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement, which 
indicated a purchase price of $18,875.42. The Purchase Agreement also indicated that a 1986 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle (Vin No. 1HD1DJL18GY500291) had been accepted as a trade-in, 
for which Appellant received a $9,400 credit. Id. 
Appellee testified that in her opinion, the actual value of Appellant's motorcycle was 
$18,000. Record on Appeal, 318, page 39, lines 22 - 25. Based apparently on the $18,875.42 
retail price listed in the Purchase Agreement, the trial court valued the 2000 Harley-Davidson 
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motorcycle at $19,000. Record on Appeal, 224, TJ69, 263, 1J2. The trial court found the payoff 
to be $5,452. Id. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the parties to divide the equity of $13,548 
equally. Id. 
In his Amended Financial Declaration, Appellant estimated that his motorcycle was 
worth $ 18,000. Record on Appeal, 124. Appellant testified that the motorcycle was brand new 
when he purchased it and he had put a "lot more miles" on it since. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 199, lines 9-18. Appellant conceded that $18,000 was a reasonable value for the 
motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 318, page 208, lines 20-25. 
The trial court apparently rounded up from the motorcycle's retail price of $18,875.42, as 
listed in the Purchase Agreement, to arrive at the $19,000 value. The trial court may have 
believed that was an appropriate value since there was a waiting time for new Harley-Davidson 
motorcycles. Record on Appeal, 318, page 152, lines 2 -13 . The trial court may not have 
believed Appellant's testimony regarding the additional miles, since Appellant initially gave an 
estimate of $16,000 for the motorcycle, which he conceded under cross-examination, was an 
understatement of its value. Record on Appeal 318, page 209, lines 2 - 4 , Respondent's Exhibit 
Q, I96,1f67. 
Nevertheless, is far more reasonable that a new motorcycle that has been driven some 
distance has diminished at least somewhat in value. Moreover, even if the trial court rejected 
Appellant's value, there was no reason to reject Appellee's value, since she presumably had 
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incentive to value the motorcycle at its greatest value, since she knew it was going to be awarded 
to Appellant. The evidence did not support that finding and the trial court abused once again 
abused its discretion. The trial court failed to make adequate findings as to why it valued the 
motorcycle at $19,000. It simply recited the retail purchase price of $19,000, observed that 
Appellant had valued it at $16,000 in testimony and $18,000 in other documents, and then 
valued it at $19,000. Record on Appeal 224, pffl|67 and 69, 2391[13, 261 T|4. 
Absent unusual circumstances, the law presumes that the marital estate should be divided 
equally. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court's property and debt 
allocations must be based on adequate findings and the failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. 
Id, at 1021. The trial court's failure to make adequate findings on this issue is an abuse of 
discretion. {Id.) 
Although the trade-in motorcycle was mentioned on the Purchase Agreement, there was 
no testimony from either party as to the date Appellant purchased it, or as to whether it was 
premarital. Appellant did not request at trial that he be given credit for the premarital 
motorcycle. In the absence of any specific testimony on this issue, the trial court ordered the 
parties to divide equally the "marital equity" in the motorcycle, which included the credit for the 
trade-in. Record on Appeal 224, ^|69. 
In his Answer to the Petition for Divorce, filed on or about December 28, 2000, Appellant 
alleged that he had purchased the 1986 Harley-Davidson motorcycle prior to the marriage and 
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had traded it in on the 2000 Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 20, ^|6. He further 
requested a credit of approximately $10,000 of equity from the premarital motorcycle against 
the equity in the 2000 Harley- Davidson motorcycle. Id. This allegation was not controverted in 
the trial testimony. 
In general, each party should receive the real and personal property he or she brought 
into the marriage. Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 304, 306 (Utah 1988), Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). Exceptions include when the premarital property has 
become commingled with a marital asset. Burt, supra, at 1168. Under those circumstances, a 
trial court should properly consider the premarital contribution when dividing the marital asset. 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). That may be why the trial court 
decided as it did, but without adequate findings, it is impossible to know. Apparently, the trial 
court did not consider whether the trade-in was premarital and therefore Appellant was entitled 
to a credit for his contribution. The trial court's failure was an abuse of discretion. The trial 
court made no findings as to why it did not give Appellant credit for his pre-marital contribution 
to a marital asset. The failure to make adequate factual findings on this issue is an abuse of 
discretion. (Id.) 
The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital property. Its valuation of 
Appellant's motorcycle should be set aside. Howell, supra, 806 P.2d, at 211. 
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2. The Valuation of the 1995 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle 
The trial court was asked to value the parties' 1995 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, 
acquired during the marriage. 
Appellee testified that the motorcycle was in good condition at the time of sale but had an 
oil leak. Record on Appeal, 318, page 36, lines 7 -11 . She further testified that the fact that the 
motorcycle had an oil leak was reflected in the lower sales price Id, lines 12 - 14. She testified 
that she had researched the NAD A blue book value of her motorcycle before selling it and had 
learned that it was $9500. Id., page 77, lines 6 - 12. She also testified that she looked at 
advertisements for similar motorcycles in the newspaper and attempted to sell the motorcycle 
through the newspaper, before finally taking it to the dealership to be sold. Id., lines 15 - 17. 
The trial court found, apparently based on Appellee's testimony, that the $9,400 she 
received from the sale of the 1995 motorcycle was fair and reasonable compensation for a 
motorcycle of the same year and in like condition and repair. Record on Appeal 223, ^ [63. The 
trial court apparently believed that because Appellee stood to be equally disadvantaged by a low 
sales price, she had obtained the best price she could have, under the circumstances. Record on 
Appeal 318, page 277, lines 3 - 12. The trial court also believed that if she had really had 
wanted to dump the motorcycle, as Appellant argued, she could have easily gotten less. Id., 
lines 13-17. 
17 
Appellant testified that he had researched the NADA blue book evaluation on 1995 
Harley Davidson motorcycles and it gave her motorcycle a value of $12,800. Record on Appeal, 
318, page 146, lines 1 - 4, Respondent's Exhibit HH and II. He testified that he had also 
researched the value of Appellee's motorcycle through newspaper ads for comparable bikes, and 
found the asking prices to be between $13,000 and $15,000. Record on Appeal, 318, page 145, 
lines 16 - 25, page 146, lines 1 - 7, Respondent's Exhibit HH and II. He testified that the NADA 
blue book rate did not include accessories. Record on Appeal, 318, lines 22-23. He testified 
that Appellee's motorcycle had accessories which would increase the value by "$1500 plus," 
such as chrome controls, brake clutch, foot pads, extra exhaust, custom seats, air cleaners, timing 
covers, and primary covers. Record on Appeal, 318, page 147, lines 3-10. He testified that in 
one ad in the newspaper for a motorcycle exactly like hers, the asking price was $14,000. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 148, lines 11-13. He testified that in another ad for a motorcycle 
one year older than hers, the asking price was $14,900. Id., Inesl3 - 15. Appellant further 
testified that the motorcycle's oil leak was insignificant and would have only cost $500 to fix. 
{Record on Appeal, 318, page 235, lines 3 - 9 . He claimed the leak was merely cosmetic and did 
not effect the motorcycle's performance Id., lines 15-17. 
In closing, the Appellant argued that Appellee's bitter and calculated purpose to punish 
Appellant should be viewed as a whole. Record on Appeal, 318, page 277, lnes 3-15. 
Appellant cited to Appellee's comments to her friend at the garage sale that she was not going to 
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leave anything for Appellant (Record on Appeal, 318, page 107, lines 1 - 7), her concealment of 
a bank account from Appellant {Record on Appeal, 226, TJ92) her sale of the diamond ring to her 
mother for below the appraised value {Record on Appeal, 198, ^ [78 and her sale of the 
motorcycle at a price far below its value are consistent with her goal to punish Appellant. Record 
on Appeal 318, page 277, lines 3 - 19. 
There was ample evidence presented that the value of Appellee's motorcycle, based on 
the NADA blue book and newspaper advertisements for comparable motorcycles, exceeded the 
sales price by as much as $5,000. It is unfair and inequitable to value Appellant's almost two 
year old motorcycle at its purchase price, on the one hand, and on the other hand to accept the 
sales price Appellee obtained for the motorcycle through the dealer. Especially when there was 
ample evidence presented that she was trying to minimize the amount of money Appellant was 
to receive from the division of the marital property. It was an abuse of discretion to value the 
motorcycle at the sales price of $9,400. Additionally, the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings as to why it valued the motorcycle at that price. 
Absent unusual circumstances, the law presumes that the marital estate should be divided 
equally. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court's property and debt 
allocations must be based on adequate findings and the failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. 
Id, at 1021. The trial court's failure to make adequate findings on this issue is an abuse of 
discretion. (Id.) 
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The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital property. Its valuation of 
Appellee's motorcycle should be set aside. Howell supra, 806 P.2d, at 211. 
3. The Valuation of the Ford Truck 
The trial court was asked to value the parties' 1992 Ford F250 pick-up truck, acquired 
during the marriage. 
Appellee presented the testimony of Jeff King, who was in charge of salesmen at Larry 
Miller Ford in West Valley City. Record on Appeal 318, page 94, In 20. Mr. King testified that 
although he had not actually inspected the vehicle to determine what options it had and its 
condition, he estimated its value as being "somewhere close to the $10,000 range retail." Record 
on Appeal 318, page 96, lines 16 -24. He gave that value as the price he expected Appellant to 
receive if he sold it on his own. Id., In 25, page 97, lines 1 - 5. He indicated that was the price for 
a "standard pickup" and indicated that the truck could be worth even more, with options. Id. 
He testified that he used the standard mileage figure of 90,000,and that mileage up to 110,000 
would not substantially affect the truck's value. Record on Appeal 318, page 97, 10 - 15. 
On cross-examination, Appellant presented Mr. King with the NADA blue book value for 
a 1992 Ford pick-up truck Record on Appeal 318, page 98, lines 1 - 25, page 99, In 1, 
Respondent Exhibit EE. Mr. King admitted that if the truck were two wheel drive and had no 
extra cab, the value would change substantially. Record on Appeal 318, page 98, lines 21 - 22. 
Also on cross examination, Mr. King admitted his estimated value was for a supercab, and not a 
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4 x 4 . Record on Appeal 318, page 99, lines 3 - 8. Also on cross, Appellee's witness regarding 
the truck's value reduced his estimate of that truck's value to $7,000. Record on Appeal 318, 
page 100, lines 17-19. 
Appellant testified that he had researched the NADA blue book evaluation on 1992 Ford 
F250 pick up trucks and it gave the truck a high value of $6,375. Record on Appeal 318, page 
150, lines 2 - 7. Respondent Exhibit EE. He testified that the vehicle had been used as a work 
truck for seven years and had 110,000 miles. Id., lines 6 -7. He testified that the vehicle had a 
lot of dents, and that "the bumper was bent, the tail gate has got some damage to it, the bed of 
the truck is all banged up." Id, lines 14 - 19. He also testified that the paint was chipped. Id, 
lines 18-19. He also testified that he had researched trucks in the newspaper and that a truck 
with a five speed, his being an automatic, was advertised for $3500. Id., lines 23 - 25, 
Respondent Exhibit. FF. He estimated that his truck was worth in the range of $3,500 to 
$4,000. Record on Appeal, 318, page 151, lines 9-13. He testified that even though the truck 
in the paper was not a diesel as his is, it would not increase the value. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 237, lines 14 - 18. Appellant later testified that the truck had a shell and he agreed with Mr. 
King's testimony that it would increase the value of the truck by $150 to $200. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 250, lines 2-11. Appellant introduced photographs of the truck reflecting its 
damaged condition. Record on Appeal, 318, page 239, lines 12 -25, page 240, lines 1 - 2, 
Respondent Exhibit JJ. 
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The trial court, apparently based on Mr. King's testimony, valued the truck at $7,500. 
Record on Appeal 224, [^70. The trial court awarded the truck to Appellant and ordered the 
parties to share equally the equity in the truck. Id. The trial court apparently did not believe 
Appellant's testimony regarding the lower value. 
There was ample evidence presented that Appellant's truck was in poor condition, with 
high miles, and should not have been valued at above the high blue book provided by Appellee's 
own expert, Mr. King, for a truck with superior options. Mr. King estimated its value at $7,000, 
or between $7,150 and $7,200 with the addition of a shell. Record on Appeal 318, page 250, 
lines 2 -11. It is unfair and inequitable to, on the one hand, value Appellant's truck at above high 
blue book value, value Appellant's almost two year old motorcycle at its purchase price, and on 
the other hand, simply accept the sales price Appellee obtained for her motorcycle. The 
evidence does not support a value of $7,500 for the truck. Record on Appeal 318, page 100, 
lines 17 - 19, page 250, lines 2-11. It was abuse of the trial court's discretion to value the truck 
at $7,500. 
Absent unusual circumstances, the law presumes that the marital estate should be divided 
equally. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court's property and debt 
allocations must be based on adequate findings and the failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. 
Id, at 1021. The trial court's failure to make adequate findings on this issue is an abuse of 
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discretion. {Id.) The trial court did not make specific findings as to why it valued the truck at 
$7,500. The trial court's failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. Id. 
The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital property. Its valuation 
of Appellant's truck should be set aside. Howell supra, 806 P.2d, at 211. 
4. The Valuation of the Premarital Construction Tools and Diamond Ring 
The trial court was asked to value the parties' tools and a diamond ring that Appellee 
purchased for herself during the marriage. 
Appellant offered the insurance appraisal on the diamond ring, which valued it at $4,500. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 78, lines 1 - 9, Respondent Exhibit I. Appellant presented 
testimony of the parties' mutual friend, Claudia Bennion, who testified that the Appellee told her 
that she paid $5000 for the diamond ring. Record on Appeal, 318, page 108, lines 16 - 18. Ms. 
Bennion further testified that Appellee told her that Appellant paid between $400 and $500 for 
the table saw. Id., lines 13-15. Appellant testified that he had construction tools worth 
thousands of dollars and that he had acquired most of it prior to the marriage. Record on Appeal, 
318,page201,lines9- 14. 
Appellee presented no testimony regarding the type or value of Appellant's tools, either 
marital or premarital. She produced no evidence controverting Appellant's testimony that he 
had construction tools, the majority of which were acquired prior to the marriage. 
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The trial court found that Appellee paid $2,400 for the diamond ring. Record on 
Appeal 225, ^ 77, Respondent Exhibit I. The trial court found that the diamond ring had been 
appraised for insurance purposes at $4,500 Id. The trial court found that the sale of the ring for 
$500 was less than the ring's actual value. Id, f78. The trial court found that "detailed 
testimony was not elicited regarding the actual value of hand tools, compressors, table saws, and 
other items of property which remained in the [Appellant's] possession, which the Petitioner 
alleged was equal to the value of the ring." Id. It cited the testimony of Appellant's witness, 
Claudia Bennion, in support of this finding. Record on Appeal 198, \ll. The trial court 
therefore apparently netted the value of Appellee's diamond ring against the value of 
Appellant's tools, because it did not award either party an equalizing payment. 
Appellee did not testify regarding the purchase price of the diamond ring, did not claim 
she purchased it for $2,400, and did not even list the ring as an asset on her financial 
declarations. Record on Appeal 15, 33, Petitioner's Exhibit 21). The trial court's factual 
findings should be set aside, where they are found to be clearly erroneous. D'Aston v. D Aston, 
844 P.2d 345, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The trial court's factual finding is directly contrary to 
the only testimony on the subject of the ring's purchase price, that of Claudia Bennion, who 
testified that Appellee admitted to paying $5000 for the ring. Record on Appeal 318, lines 15 -
18. The trial court's finding that the purchase price of the ring was $2,400 (, Record on Appeal, 
198, ^|77), should be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
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The trial court did not value the diamond ring, nor did it value Appellant's tools. Since 
the trial court netted one against the other, based on the erroneous value of $2,400 for the ring, 
that finding should also be set aside. Id., \19. The trial court also accepted without foundation 
Appellee's allegation that the value of the marital tools was equal to the value of the ring; 
however, the actual testimony was that Appellee bought the diamond ring and justified it on the 
grounds that Appellant had gone out and bought the $400 - $500 table saw. Record on Appeal 
318, page 108, lines 10 - 12. In fact, Ms. Bennion testified that Appellee referred to it as the 
"table saw ring." Id. The finding that Appellee claimed the value of the ring to be equal to 
Appellant's tools should be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
The trial court's finding that "detailed testimony was not elicited regarding the actual 
value of table saws," also is clearly erroneous. Record on Appeal 225, \19. Ms. Bennion 
testified that Appellee told her that Appellant paid between $400 and $500 for the table saw. 
Record on Appeal 318, page 108, lines 10 - 12. 
It is clearly erroneous, unfair and inequitable to net a diamond ring that cost $5000, and 
which was appraised at $4,500 against a table saw worth between $400 and $500. There was 
substantial evidence to support a finding that most of Appellant's tools were acquired before the 
marriage, that the diamond ring was valued at $4,500 or $5,000 and that the table saw should be 
valued at $400 or $500 - with Appellant awarded an appropriate equalizing payment. 
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The trial court made no specific findings as to the value of the ring or the table saw and 
claimed it could not make factual findings regarding the tools, despite the evidence that the table 
saw cost between $400 and $500 and the majority of the tools were premarital. Record on 
Appeal 225, f79, 318, page 108, lines 13 - 15, page 201, lines 9-14. 
Absent unusual circumstances, the law presumes that the marital estate should be divided 
equally. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court's property and debt 
allocations must be based on adequate findings and the failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. 
Id, at 1021. The failure to make adequate factual findings on the value of the ring and the table 
saw is an abuse of discretion. {Id.) 
The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital property. Its valuation of 
Appellant's tools and Appellee's diamond ring should be set aside. Howell, supra, 806 P.2d, at 
211. 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support The Trial Court's Award of Permanent Alimony 
to Appellee 
The trial court was asked to determine whether Appellant should be ordered to pay 
permanent alimony to Appellee. 
The trial court had before it three financial statements filed by Appellee in support of her 
request for alimony: a financial declaration dated November 16, 2000, (Record on Appeal, 15), 
a financial declaration dated January 8, 2001, {Record on Appeal, 33), and a financial 
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declaration list, dated October 26, 2001, (Petitioner's Exhibit 21). The financial declaration 
list reflected Appellee's net monthly income of $2,334.66 and average monthly living expenses 
for her and her 17 year old son of $3,519.30. Id. Appellee's expenses included revolving credit 
installments payments of $882.12, private school expenses of $100, automobile gas, insurance 
and installment payments of $672.18 for her new Hyundai automobile (valued at $15,726.49) 
and her son's new Ford Ranger truck (valued at $19,446.25), both purchased after the date of 
separation. 
The trial court had before it two financial statements filed by Appellant in opposition to 
Appellee's request for alimony: a financial declaration dated January 25, 2001 (Record on 
Appeal, 51), and a financial declaration dated October 10, 2001. {Record on Appeal, 124). 
The trial court found that Appellant's current reasonable and fair living expenses upon the sale 
of the marital home to be $2,576 and his net monthly was $3,170. Record on Appeal 227, and 
2 2 9 , ^ 100 and 115. 
Based on these findings, the trial court found that Appellee had established a need for 
alimony (based on a shortfall of $1,300.64) and that Appellant had the financial ability to 
support her. Record on Appeal 228, and 229, Tflj 107, 108, 117. The trial court awarded 
Appellee $250 per month until the marital home sold and $500 per month thereafter, for the 
length of the marriage. Record on Appeal 239 and 240 , ffif 15 and 16, 261, \A. Based solely on 
the numbers the trial court used, its decision was reasonable. 
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The trial court determines alimony awards between divorcing parties under Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5. In making that determination, the court must consider the following factors: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse 
to attend school during the marriage. 
In determining a reasonable alimony award, the trial court must consider the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, her ability to produce sufficient income for herself and her 
husband's ability to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). If the trial court has not considered these 
factors or has not supported its ruling with adequate findings based on sufficient evidence, or has 
abused its discretion, the decision must be reversed. Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
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Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5 (ii) requires the trial court to consider the alimony recipient ks 
ability to support herself as one factor in determining whether alimony should be awarded. 
Appellee had temporary possession of the marital home for six months, from January ,2001 -
July, 2001. Record on Appeal 218,^30,31,33. Appellant's witness, Ms. Bennion, testified 
that Appellee held a garage sale of household goods in June, 2001. Record on Appeal 318, page 
106, lines 7 -11 . Ms. Bennion testified that Appellee sold clothes, dressers, a cedar chest, 
sewing machine, knick knacks and jewelry. Id., lines 18-21. Ms. Bennion testified that 
Appellee told her that she "was selling everything," including a teak wood fish that Ms. Bennion 
had given Appellant. Id., lines, 5 - 14. Ms. Bennion testified that Appellee said she was not 
going to leave anything for [Appellant.] Id., In 7. 
After the date of separation, Appellee ran up significant credit cards to such retailers and 
credit card companies as R.C. Willey, (3,347.15) Granite Furniture, ($1,505.52) Mt. America, 
($1,907.04) Discover, (2,346.00) Lowe's, ($700) and Dell Computers ($1,454.10). Petitioner's 
Exhibit 21. She also had a credit card debt with Citibank($85054.71). Id. The trial court ordered 
Appellee to be solely responsible for these debts since they were incurred after the date of 
separation. Record on Appeal, 240, ff 18 - 23. With respect to the Citibank debt, Appellee failed 
to meet her burden of proving that it was a marital obligation since she did not disclose it until 
the day of trial. Record on Appeal, 229, ^ |120. The monthly payments for these debts and 
obligations alone total $532.12. (Id) Appellee testified that she incurred many of these debis to 
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page 57, lines 17 - 22. 
B) ordering Appellant to pay Appellee permanent alimony of $500, contravenes the trial 
court's finding that Appellee should be solely responsible for these debts incurred after the date 
ill st'iMi.iiiliHitiii I'll 111 (in (HIILII n | IK, |MII . \\ ilh lllli/V") mi iiiiit" (it il I mi! I iii|ii lilt' hill . iftn rpiiutmn 
so they can conveniently demonstrate a "need" for alimony. It rewards Appellee for selling the 
household goods at a garage sale so she has an excuse for purchasing new to furnish her 
condominium, all courtesy of Appellant, It is unfair and inequitable to require Appellant to 
undei vv rite Appellee' 's extra \ agai it purchases. I )ediu IIIIJJ; (lie - .: n; .. ,M . ad 
i ' - itl I these debts, ($1300 64 $532 12). reduces Appellee's ••••.-.: • ^permanent . . 
$768.52. 
Similarly, Appellee claims a debt to Linda Tobin of $3,034.00, with a monthly payment 
n. : -..;. .. * Hxhibn . . ihe trial •. »,. iound that this debt was incurred so i Appellant 
• i i >! '"< ftfM I ' I I I J i i ' I ' M 1 H I M " I ' n 
Appeal 220, f^lf 36 and 37. The trial court found that Appellee was solely obligated to repay the 
Tobin loan. ItI By ordering Appellant to pay Appellee permanent alimony, contravenes the 
t t: ial c .01 it I ' ; fn idii lg that Appellee should be solely responsible • foi the I obii I del : >t i \ i '. It is 
liiili'tiiii mil np i i l ill HI*1 I pnrpni l In iiiiiill i, .iiiiiii i|iii ill ultlHl MM r iihiiii I'llim mi In \\\ IHJIIK> pern i.incut 
alimony, one party ends up assuming the entire debt. Deducting the installments payment 
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associated with this debt, ($768.52 - $150), further reduces Appellee's need for permanent 
alimony to $618.52. 
Finally, Appellee acquired a new 2001 Hyundai Tiburon automobile and a new Ford 
Ranger truck for her 18 year old son, Jason, after the date of separation, worth $15,726.49 and 
$19,446.25, respectively. Record on Appeal 318, page 59, lines 4 - 8., Petitioner's Exhibit 21. 
The gas, insurance and installment payments on these vehicles cost $672.18 per month, of which 
$200 is the truck lease payment. Id. Appellee clearly had the ability to acquire a less expensive 
vehicle for Jason and/or to purchase no vehicle for him at all. The insurance expense for a male 
teenage driver in a new vehicle surely represents the lion's share of Appellee's $348.18 per 
month gas and insurance expense. Jason is not Appellant's child and Appellant should not have 
to pay for his expensive transportation. Appellee already sends the child to private school and 
has included his food, gas, clothing and entertainment expenses in her financial declaration. It is 
unfair and inequitable to tack an expensive car payment on top of all this and demand that 
Appellant contribute each month. Deducting Jason's lease payment ($200) and half the 
gas/insurance monthly payment ($174.09) and his private school ($100), further reduces 
Appellee's need for alimony to $144.43. 
The trial court found that Appellant's current reasonable and fair living expenses upon the 
sale of the marital home to be $2,576 and his net monthly was $3,170. Record on Appeal, 227, 
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each month to satisfy an alimony obligation to Appellee. 
The trial court excluded from Appellant's monthly living expenses a $250 monthly 
payment for the parties' Marriott timeshare and the $150 monthly payment for the parties' 
WorMin.'irl linirsliatc, nli idi llie IIMI umiil awarded to Appellant. /u , ; / /u on. ippeai , 221, 228-
229 If 44, Tf 112. The trial court found thn-
Appellee testified that she had found a purchaser for the WorldMart timeshare. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 34, lines 4 - 20. Appellant testified he was unwilling to sell it. Id, page 207, 
Hi le s 18 21 .! ' i ppellai it testified that 1 le was willing to sell the Marriott timeshare. Id., page 
207, lines 22 - 23 Die trial coi irt i na> h " ilctult d '1 "" »i iiilc U linlm I lln (iineslian 
payment from Appellant 's monthly expenses based on Appellee's testimony that the WorldMart 
timeshare could be sold. The trial court may have decided to deduct both timeshares from 
i \ ppellai it 's i noi ithl> expenses because Appellee testified that the timeshares were a "luxury" 
and Appellant testifier Mi< " .mini U\ Lvp(fm> WoiMli I ni Imn1 Icin
 (i' page M, liiu. li i *, 
page 
The trial court asked Appellant if he could sell the timeshares. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 20 / li i 25 ^ppellai it responded that he "checked with several real estate firms that deal in 
timeshares ,nu! iillillit \ \ w f I it IK '.I uni i inihl illn h in ^vi i iiriii I*n \\\ in J S M I I I K ; M I U I p \\ i i i e i i h 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 208, In 3-5. 
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The trial court made no specific findings as to why it was appropriate to eliminate the 
timeshare payments when the timeshares had no value and there was no testimony that they were 
actually sold. Appellant was still responsible for making the monthly payments of $250 and 
$150 as of the date the trial court ordered him to pay monthly alimony of $500. The parties 
purchased the timeshares during the marriage and therefore decided that they were a "luxury'" 
they could afford. It is unfair to penalize Appellant by awarding him the worthless timeshares 
and the monthly obligations thereon, and then eliminating the payments from his monthly living 
expenses when calculating alimony. Appellee should share in the lingering responsibilities for 
assets acquired during the marriage. 
Although Appellee testified she had a purchaser for the WorldMart timeshare, there was 
no signed contract and Appellant testified that he wanted to keep it. Id. There was no testimony 
that there was a purchaser for the Marriott timeshare. It is unfair on the one hand to eliminate 
the timeshare payment from Appellant's monthly living expenses and on the other, require him 
to defray the monthly costs for Appellee's son's new truck, insurance and private school. A 
timeshare is no more a luxury than a brand new truck for a 17 year old boy. 
The trial court's finding that Appellant's living expenses were $2,576 was clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. Appellant's living expenses should have been $2,976. 
Considering then his net income of $3,170, Appellant only had the ability to pay Appellee $ 194 
in permanent alimony. 
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Petitioner. To award 
permanent alimony of $500 was an abuse of discretion. The perm- ) 
Appellee should be set aside. Stevens, supra, 754 P.2d , at 958. 
C. The Testimony of Appellee's Rebuttal Witness Was Improperly Admitted 
Appellee
 c ane ( j Barbara Underhill, a certified public accountant, as a surprise expert 
rebuttal witness L C M I U ' I l,yin/ ilM jsige IV' IHHS II I 'ijipi ll.ihl nh[n,lt J linn M-( 
Underhill was not properly a rebuttal witness because her testimony should have been part of 
Appellee's case in chief and Appellant had not addressed how Appellee had allocated her 
i :- M. . Re. \ :;<: . ir,:-i .,< \ page z: •. uiic.s > - ~ response. Appellee argued that 
Ms. Underbill i -.s . :^ he 
deductibility of certain claimed exemptions by Mr. Shaw under the IRS regulations , lines 18 
- 22 Appellant argued that if that were the case, Appellant gave no notice that there was going 
to be expert witness testimony and Appellee provided no report or opinion Id., lines 23 - 25. 
Appellant i nmpliimrd lli.il In li.nl imp IN muni INK I in InliiiK ', imanic (tie da\ hefore and that 
there was no designation as to her expected testimony. Id, In 25, page 258, line s 1 3 I he tri. il 
court nevertheless allowed Ms. Underhill to testify as a rebuttal witness. Id, lines 4 - 5. 
Ms. I Jnderhill testified that she prepared Appellee's income tax return for the 2000 
in i <»Mir t,i\ uMii / .v ( , , i /ni Ijijhii/ 11v page 2S7 I nu \ \he leslilicd that Appellee 
claimed one-half the mortgage interest deducti 
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return. Record on Appeal, 318, page 258, lines 9-23. She was asked to review Appellant's 
2000 income tax return and testify as to how he had allocated the mortgage interest deduction. 
Record on Appeal 318, page 259, lines 19-23, 260, lnesl5 - 19. Appellant once again objected 
to this question as being outside the scope of the direct examination because he did not ask 
Appellant about the percentage he had allocated. Record on Appeal, 318, page 259, In 25, page 
260, lines 1 -2. Appellee argued in response that she had asked Appellant if he had assisted in 
the preparation of the 2000 income tax return and he had claimed he did. Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 226, lines 5-10, page 260, lines 3 - 6. The trial court allowed Ms. Underwood continue. 
Record on Appeal, page 260, In 14. 
Ms. Underhill testified that Appellant had claimed the entire mortgage interest deduction 
and property taxes and half the income tax refund. Id., lines 15 - 19. She opined that the 
inconsistencies in the returns subjected both parties to a potential audit or "increased IRS 
action." Record on Appeal, 318, page 261, lines 4 - 9 . She opined that the best way to resolve 
the matter would be for one of the parties' income tax returns to be amended. Id, lines 10-1 13. 
She also opined regarding the IRS regulations regarding mileage claimed in performance of job 
duties. Id., lines 14 - 25, page 262, lines 1-11. She opined that if an employee were 
reimbursed for mileage, the employee would not be entitled to claim the mileage as a business 
expense. Id. . 
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and property taxes on her 2000 income return and that Appellant had claimed 100% ol On san t 
deductions on his 2000 income tax return Record on Appeal, 222, ffl[54 and 55. The trial court 
found that Appellant should file an amended tax return for 2000, claiming only one-half the 
iiileivst deductions U", nl II 'if. I lie li i.illll unit ;ilsn I mill III.ill Appellai it' s claii i l for an 
employee business mileage expense was "unreasonable insupporte 
fraud. V 4 1 5 6 . 
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 401 and 
40J" II Ms Underwood1. ,* - . _ the tnai . nad the right to make 
determinations regarding the relative credibility of > itnesses I J Zi j - il Pi oce cfi n e, 
Rule 52(a); D'Aston v D 'Aston, 844 P.2d 345,355 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Appellee called Ms. Underhill as surprise rebuttal witness To the extent Ms. Underhill 
hslifled ,n trial ,i, ,i l.ii nine , in n Initial, under Utah Rules of Evidence, Ruk - Mie was 
only permitted to testify regarding evidei n r required bu ,nhi ml (In m ulein e pi r ,euii nil1 m lie i I 
examination. Adams v. Lang, 275 P.2d 881, 882 (1954). The only possibly related question, 
asked by Appellee on cross-examination, was whether Appellant had assisted in the preparation 
el lln Midi) meoiuelfp relmii mil In lli.nl i liiiiiieil Hi Illnlll Kecom on Appeal UK page 226, 
lines 5 - ±w. , ige 260, lines 3 Appellee asked IIMI I in i > • .ill mi ill nil lee.ill line llie nieitjitip nn onu 
deduction and property taxes. Because Appellant did not testify regarding the mortgage interest 
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deductions on direct examination, Ms. Underbill's testimony was not properly admitted. Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rules 701, Adams, 275 P.2d at 882. 
The trial court may have found that asking if Appellant assisted in the preparation of the 
2000 income tax return opened the door to Ms. Underbill's rebuttal testimony on the mortgage 
interest deduction allocation; however the trial court made no findings regarding the basis for 
overruling Appellant's objection. Failure to make adequate findings is an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Larsen, supra, 856 P2d, at 1361. 
Ms. Underhill, a certified public accountant, could have testified as an expert witness in 
rebuttal, under Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 702, if she qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training or education. The matter of determining the qualifications of an expert 
witness is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984). 
Appellant did not qualify Ms. Underhill as an expert witness. 
If she was being offered as an expert, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26(a)(3)(A) 
and Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, required Appellee to disclose the 
identity of her expert witness in advance of trial. The disclosure required by subsection 
(a)(3)(A) must be accompanied by a written report, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the Court. Rule 26(a)(3)(B). The written report which is required with the disclosure 
of the expert witness's identity under (a)(3)(B), must contain the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
37 
expected In I/*1 11* .u1 ' l ui!M»i."i» ||«I , | i | . " " I I M I M I I ' . '«M I " " I' p i ' M ' H i I \ \ \ A \ \ \ i m i l i ' i U n l e 
26(a)(3)(C), unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by Subdivision (a)(3)(A) must be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact 
discovery or, if tlle evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same 
s u b i o i l f t t f t t h T nil n l i t i e i l h\ . i n o l l u ' i f u l l 1 i i i i i d n p . u a ^ j K t p l i ( Ml 111 ^ i l l n n iiM i h i i . i i l h ' i l h i 
disclosure made by the other pari \DDellee did not disclose Ms. Undi — f e 
day before trial and provided no written report regarding her expected testimony. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 257, lines 23 -25, page 258, lines 1 - 3 
1 1 ite ti ial • :o;! ii I: it n ; findings me basis
 : ^ overruling Appellant's objections. It . 
may have been that the trial court did not believe that •  I Ii iciei hill \ v as testify In,g as ai i expert 
witness, and therefore, the requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26(a)(3)(A) and 
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, did not have to be met. Despite not being 
qualihnl x> an i • \K\ I [ , I1 (Jnderhill opined on such issues as whether the filing of conflicting 
reports would create .1 pmblnn lor tin \\\\\\\ s iniJ li<m Ilin IKS RiTiihdnii, • uldiosv'tl lln isaie 
of business mileage. Record on Appeal 318, page 261, lines 4 8 , 14 - 25, page 262, lines 1 -
11 She should not have been permitted to give this "expert testimony," without being qualified 
I t w a s e m u h i I i i a u i i l l u w r d M K I h u l l i l i i l l I i I r s l i h a s .i r r h n l h i l w limit s i m n l i i I Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1). It was an abuse of discretion to allow her to testify as an 
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expert witness. Larsen, supra. This Court must still decide if it was harmless error. State of 
Utah v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). 
Since the parties resided together as husband and wife for all of 2000, it may well be that 
it was appropriate for them to share the mortgage income deduction equally. Also, the trial court 
may not have believed Appellant that he had sought advise from his accountant and the 
accountant had advised him to claim the entire deduction and the business expense mileage. If 
so, then it was harmless error to allow Ms. Underhill to testify. 
Had Appellant known that Ms. Underhill would be testifying regarding the issue of the 
mortgage interest deduction and business mileage deduction, he would have called the parties' 
former accountant to testify on his behalf and to present evidence that the accountant had 
advised Appellant that he was entitled to claim the entire deduction for the 2000 income tax year 
and the business mileage and justifying Appellant's right to claim them. Even Ms. Underhill 
conceded on cross-examination that if Appellant had given his CPA all the relevant information, 
allowed the CPA to make his analysis, and to advise him how to proceed, it would have been 
reasonable for Appellant to have followed his accountant's advise. Record on Appeal 318, page 
265, lines 10 -25, page 266, In 1. Appellant was deprived of the opportunity to present the 
testimony of his own certified public accountant as to the advice he received. Ms. Underbill's 
testimony went unrebutted and Appellant was ordered to amend his return, costing thousands of 
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d u l l a i s I linn ^ ill v J mi I I  in JII in mi ill I  i ' s s v m n I n \W\w\ h I , I IIIH 
expert witness. 
ill: > ; C O N C L U S I O N 
F i n . i l l l l n I n i e g o i n g ii I M I H I S A p p i H a u l i c s [ n i l l i i i l lh i n | i u s l s l l i i i I ' m i l l I 
(1) remand this matter to the trial court for more detailed and further findings 
regarding the issues of property division and valuation; 
(2) reverse the award of permanent alimony to Appellee; 
( 3 ) r e v e r s e l l n milk i l l i a l \ p | i r l l i i n l „imin iiinJII llliii'i "IIIKI 111101111" t a \ in:1111111 .11111 1 i v i i w n Il 
the issue to the trial court to permit testimony from the parties' accountant. 
Dated: September 12, 2002 
4 0 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent-
Appellant was served by mail, first class postage prepaid, this September 12, 2002,, to the 
following counsel of record: 
James I. Watts, Esq. 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City JJT84111 
I Gayanref K. SchmidX 
V Attorney tor Respondent-Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
FILES DISTiSCT COURT 
Third Jtidicial District 
riMim 
THIRD JTrnj^lKLj ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA SHAW, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
SCOTT SHAN, S 
Respondent. : 
j DlpinyCierk 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 0 0 4 9 0 7 1 3 6 
This matter having come on regularly for trial pursuant to 
Notice before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on October 29 and 
30, 2001, Melissa J. Shaw appearing in person and represented by 
James I. Watts, and the respondent Scott Shaw appearing in person 
and represented by Richard G. Hackwell, the Court having received 
exhibits, taken testimony of the parties and their respective 
witnesses, received and heard the arguments of counsel, and 
otherwise being fully advised, hereby enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-3-
4(1), and that venue is proper. 
2. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of 
Salt Lake County for at least three months immediately prior to the 
filing of the Complaint for divorce in this action. 
\0"\ 
SHAW V SH I II VAGE ? 
I! illhin11 I i II, ill III" I ci" i l l in, MI ill 1 mi Il l uf tponrl f . ' i i l i i .'I 
married on August i Sturgis, South Dakota. 
4. The Court finds that the parties separated WJL about 
January " I ' ' > ( • ' ' i i ' i ( ' • h * « w\y 1,"! i it 
5. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
arisen :i n the marriage, which makes continuation ~^  a viable 
marriage s .1 i :i mp :: s 1: J 3 :1 1:.] i 
6. The Court finds that there have been no children born of 
this marriage and none expected. 
7 . H i i i 'in in I I il il h a t: t l l e f: ai: I: i e s 1 la ill en-Hi I ill: • a 
partial s t ipulat ion , resolving certain matters raised by way of 
pe t i t ioner ' s Pet i t ion, the Court finds said st ipulat ion to be fa ir 
iiii ill ill in in in I 1 i s m t r t i in mi in mi I I in ill ill in ill in iii ii I ill in i ) in I I ill mi mi1 L N in i n in 
8. The Court finds the parties 1 s t ipulat ion to be as 
follows: 
1
 III""li Il I Il II mi HI}III J it1 e ( l i e u I I I i r i c i u o IIIIIIIILJ:. I p e n s i o n s o w n e d b y 
the parties shall be divided between them pursuant to the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order, in accordance with the Woodward formula. 
I I "I I I I " pertaii every retirement 
account or pension owned * parties as of this date, which 
should include the petitioner's and the respondent'n iM mi i aments 
fiiniii IN"1 i»<Ji lin  |i Brewing company and the respondent's retirement 
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account 401k and 457 account with the State Retirement Systems, 
Firefighters Department. 
(c) That the parties1 marital residence located at 5349 
S. Appian Way, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, has been listed for 
sale at the appraised price of $160,000 and should be sold. 
(d) That the respondent is awarded the use and 
possession of the residence during the pendency of the sale. 
(e) That the respondent shall not make any alterations, 
modifications or improvements to the home that would cost more than 
$100 without the specific authorization or approval of the 
petitioner. 
(f) That any modifications or repairs made by him will 
be the respondent's sole financial responsibility, unless such 
written approval is obtained in advance of making said 
improvements. 
(g) That the petitioner and respondent will cooperate in 
all respects in order to market the residence, to include if 
necessary, the placing of a lockbox on the residence to allow 
access at times when he is not otherwise able to be at the 
residence or would render the listing agent unable to show the 
residence 
9. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage 
the parties have acquired an interest in two parcels of real 
i (Ai 
SHAW HAW PAG- • S 
property "  Il11 ' "' |M l " ' tfM'eHt in ii I i i I imiM.ihiii vti ["" f 
petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
jllii The Cour t f i n d s t h a t - p a r t i e s acqu ired a>~ ** -524 
South *F'i* WPJ-'« Ta 
[Testimony 1 petitioner, testimony of respondent, respondentf s 
Exhibit «AAM] 
11. 1 In r- est 
home was $72,500 [Respondent's Exhibit MAAM] 
12. The Court finds that there was payment made by 
t any 
immediate equity in the property. 
13. The Court finds that the sum settlement 
c l i a I'lipi 1" i e|"'i i!»s*ifini| ji fun, j ii i i ( I i i
 t appraise se^  , <•• lit 
report, mortgage insurance, and other costs typically borne by a 
purchaser were paid by the respondent. [Responden Exhibit ,fAA"] 
14. T i n i I1 in in I I in mi Il II Ii I  II Ii r
 eSp0n(ient immediately moved 
into the home and that the petitioner moved into the residence some 
two weeks later. [Testimony of petitioner] 
15. Th E C 3ur I: finds that from I  II | Il "Hi .he petitioner was 
employed oii full-time basis, and that ?*er earnings and 
respondent's earnings were utilized I 
expenses, including mortgage, taxes, food, insurance, utilities, 
lf>** 
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entertainment, and all other living expenses. [Testimony of 
petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
16. The Court finds that the real property located at 5524 
South 3535 West was sold in or about 1996. [Testimony of 
petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
17. The Court finds that the proceeds derived from the sale 
of the 5524 South 3535 West property represented equity that had 
been created as a result of improvements made to the residence 
which were paid for by both parties, as well as general property 
value appreciation. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of 
respondent] 
18. The Court finds the net equity from the sale of the 
residence to be the sum of $15,000. [Testimony of petitioner, 
testimony of respondent] 
19. The Court finds that the respondent utilized $7,500 of 
the $15,000 amount to pay off a loan secured by his Jeep Cherokee 
automobile. [Testimony of respondent] 
20. The Court finds that the remaining $7,500 was used as a 
down payment on the real property located at 5349 S. Appian Way, 
which the parties thereafter occupied as their marital residence. 
[Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
21. Respondent should be allowed $4,290 as a credit for his 
separate property contribution to the parties1 prior residence at 
i 
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5525 S o u t h 3535 W e s t , •' I1 1 i>« / >' " > en i!-"-« i " "•» | r.ii i ; j e s 
used a port ion cif the s a l e proceeds i, I line IS.l'fj West, r e s i d e n c e t o 
acquire the marital res idence and used the balance ut the s a l e 
p roceeds of tin111 1 i I i Wri-il r e s iden t v I n • i l i s l \ i t lliiei1 ill! ,"iii i i i i i r i II 
obligations. 
Court finds that during the entire period 
ownersh 
full-time basis outside that respondent was 
employed on a full-time basis by Salt Lake City Fire Department, 
a ,1 id th* 
December 200:
 fa the respondent had secondary employment as a 
licensed general contractor, maintenance/handymar --«• *• employee 
« I I -r -ill' i i I T i l i mi1 i u p mi | M i I i I i - .imony 
petitioner, testimony of respondent, petitioners Exhibit Nos. 14, 
15, „, .. and 20] 
23. income earned 
from all sources for common living expenses, including mortgage, 
taxes, food, utilities, travel, and all other needs of the family. 
[Test
 ip0ndentj 
24. The Court finds that during the period that the parties 
resided ^ *he Appian Way property, the home was occupied the 
I <" f i ' H mi I JiiniiLMi !. son from a prior marriage, Jason, now 
i 
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age 17, the respondent, and two large dogs. [Testimony of 
petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
25. The Court finds that during the period of occupancy of 
the Appian Way property, that certain improvements were made to the 
property, including partial re-carpeting of the bedrooms in 1996, 
and the installation of a small in-ground pool. [Testimony of 
petitioner, testimony of respondent, respondent's Exhibit MXM] 
26. The Court finds that the respondent, in or about the 
years 1999-2000, removed the stairs from the deck of the house and 
started to install a used hot tub in the rear yard, and in the 
process of said work removed the cement patio in the rear of the 
home. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent, 
petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3] 
27. The Court finds that as of this date, the work to restore 
or repair the rear of the home has not been completed. [Testimony 
of respondent] 
28. The Court finds that the petitioner, following the filing 
of the Complaint, did file a Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking 
temporary Orders, which was to be heard on or about January 10, 
2001. [Courtfs file] 
29. The Court finds that at the hearing of petitioners 
Motion, the parties entered into a stipulation resolving the issues 
raised by petitioner's Motion, which stipulation was memorialized 
SHAW V. SHAW PAGE 8 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
In the Minutes of the law and motion hearing and an Order of the 
Court. 
30. The Court finds that the respondent was ordered to vacate 
the residence by January 14, 2001; the Court awarded exclusive use 
of the real property to the petitioner and her minor son, Jason, 
during the pendency of these proceedings; and, the respondent was 
to have use of the shed during the day in order to obtain tools. 
[Court's file; recommendation and Order on hearing dated January 
10, 2001] 
31. The Court finds that from and after January 4 until July 
7, 2001, the petitioner did occupy the residence with her son, 
Jason. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
32. The Court finds that from February 2001-June 2001, the 
respondent made the first and second mortgage payments pursuant to 
the parties1 stipulation and Orders of the Court. [Testimony of 
respondent] 
33. The Court finds that the petitioner vacated the residence 
on July 7, 2001, and that the respondent took possession on July 
11, 2001. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent, 
petitionees Exhibit 25] 
34. The Court finds that the carpet in the living room, 
dining room, hallways and stairs is between 10-12 years in age. 
[Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
i cro 
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35. Petitioner moved from the marital residence on or about 
Saturday, July 7, 2001. Petitioner did not inform respondent she 
had moved from the home. Over the next few days, respondent heard 
through friends petitioner had moved. On Tuesday, July 10, 2001, 
respondent became concerned for the two dogs apparently alone at 
the marital residence and inquired through counsel whether 
petitioner had moved. Respondent received his clearance to enter 
the marital residence on Wednesday, July 11, 2001. Respondent 
entered the home that afternoon with Claudia Bennion. Respondent 
and Bennion found the dogs unsupervised in the marital residence 
with an automatic feeder and water dish. Respondent and Bennion 
found the marital residence filthy and in disrepair. The carpets 
were badly soiled and rank with dog urine and feces. The back yard 
was deep in dog feces. The back yard had overgrown and then died 
out. On October 1, 2001, on respondent's Order to Show Cause, the 
Court ordered the petitioner to pay $3,345 toward the carpet. 
Respondent paid an additional $1,201.33 for the carpet. Respondent 
paid an additional $202.50 for sod. Respondent contributed labor 
to lay the sod at a value of $200. Respondent contributed an 
additional 40 hours of labor to clean the martial residence after 
he regained occupancy on July 11, 2001, for an additional credit of 
$600 which represents 40 hours at $15 per hour. Respondent's total 
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advances to repair and clean the marital residence after he retook 
possession on July 11, 2001, is $2,203.83. 
36. The Court finds that the petitioner has paid the sum of 
$3,331 to Carpet One for the replacement of the carpet in the home. 
[Testimony of petitioner] 
37. The Court finds that the petitioner, in order to make 
said payment, was required to borrow such funds from Linda Tobin, 
and that the petitioner is obligated to Ms. Tobin for said loan. 
[Testimony of petitioner, petitioner's Exhibit 21] 
38. The Court finds that prior to vacating the residence on 
January 14, 2000, the respondent, in an effort to deprive the 
petitioner of access to tools, rakes, shovels and other items 
necessary to maintain the residence, yard and sprinkling system, 
did construct an artificial wall in the garage, behind which the 
tools were secured. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of 
respondent, petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8] 
39. The Court finds that the respondent did further screw 
shut a closet within the home, behind which other tools commonly 
used to maintain and keep up the residence were stored. [Testimony 
of petitioner, testimony of respondent, petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 
5, 6, 7 and 8] 
40. The Court finds that the respondent also padlocked the 
pool house door, where pumps, filters, chlorine and chemicals, 
leu 
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necessary to properly maintain the in-ground pool were housed. 
[Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent, petitionees 
Exhibit Nos. 8 and 9] 
41. Petitioner did not take care of the house during her 
period of occupancy as well as contemplated in the Court's Order, 
but did not trash the residence to the extent claimed by 
respondent. Likewise, the respondent, except for paragraphs 38, 39 
and 40 above, did not reduce the value of the home during his 
occupancy. 
42. The Court finds that the equity within the home is 
marital property, and that any equity derived from the sale of the 
residence shall be equally divided between the parties. 
43. The Court finds that in addition to the marital 
residence, the parties have an interest in two timeshares, to wit: 
Trendwest, and the Marriott Mountainside Project in Park City, 
Utah. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent, 
petitionees Exhibit No. 10, respondent's Exhibit MBM] 
44. During the marriage the parties acquired two timeshare 
accounts, an interest in Marriott Mountainside in Park City with a 
monthly payment of $250, and a WorldMart timeshare with a monthly 
payment of $150. Neither has any market value. Respondent shall 
be awarded the timeshare accounts subject to all indebtedness 
thereon. 
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45. Any sums the parties once held jointly already have been 
divided as they desire and the parties presently have no joint bank 
accounts. 
46. Each party should be awarded any life insurance policy 
which the party presently maintains and may change the beneficiary 
as the party desires. 
47. The Court finds that for the year 1998, the petitioner 
and respondent filed joint income tax returns and had income from 
wages, salaries and tips of $83,842. [Petitioner's Exhibit 14] 
48. The Court finds that for the year 1999, the petitioner 
and respondent filed joint income tax returns and had income from 
wages, salaries and tips of $98,587. 
49. The Court finds that for the year 2000, the petitioner 
filed an individual tax return and had income from wages, salaries 
and tips of $33,401. 
50. The Court finds that for the year 2000, the respondent 
filed an individual income tax return and had income from wages, 
salaries and tips of $79,684. 
51. The Court finds that the petitioner's median income for 
the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 is the sum of $29,549. 
52. The Court finds that the respondent's median income for 
the years 1998, 1999, and 2000 is the sum of $67,351. 
\tw 
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53. The Court finds that the respondent's median income is 
2.27 times greater than the petitioner's median income. 
[Petitionees Exhibit Nos. 15, 17, 18 and 20] 
54. The Court finds that the petitioner, in filing her 
individual 2000 tax return, allocated the deduction for mortgage 
interest and property taxes equally between herself and the 
respondent. [Testimony of Barbara Underhill# CPA] 
55. The Court finds that the respondent, in filing his 
individual 2000 income tax returns claimed 100% of all mortgage 
interest deductions, deductions for the Marriott and Trendwest 
timeshares, and real property taxes. [Testimony of Barbara 
Underhill, CPA, and petitionees Exhibit 18] 
56. The Court finds that the respondent likewise claimed an 
employee business expense for miles driven, claiming 7,488 miles, 
which the Court finds to be unreasonable, unsupported, and may 
constitute tax fraud. 
57. The Court finds that the parties are at an increased risk 
of audit and financial loss unless an amended 2000 tax return is 
prepared and filed by the respondent. [Testimony of Barbara 
Underhill, CPA] 
58. The Court finds that an amended tax return should be 
filed forthwith by the respondent, claiming only one-half of the 
i 
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mortgage interest deductions, property taxes and other deductions, 
which should properly be allocated between the parties. 
59. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage 
the parties have acquired interests in certain vehicles, including 
a 1995 Harley Davidson Low Rider, a 2000 Harley Davidson, and a 
1992 Ford F250 truck. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of 
respondent] 
60. The Court finds that in 1998, the parties borrowed 
against a line of credit, the sum of $19,683.47 from Mountain 
America Credit Union, securing the loan by the parties1 Appian Way 
real property. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent, 
petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 26, 1] 
61. The Court finds that the proceeds were used to pay and 
satisfy Mountain America Credit Union's loans, which had been 
obtained to acquire the 1992 Ford truck, and the 1995 Harley 
Davidson• 
62. The Court finds that the petitioner, in or about July 
2001, sold the 1995 Harley Davidson to Harley Davidson of Salt Lake 
for the sum of $9,400. [Testimony of petitioner] 
63. The Court finds that the $9,400 received by the 
petitioner represents fair and reasonable compensation for a 1995 
Harley Davidson motorcycle in like condition and repair. 
\<\<: 
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64. The Court finds that the respondent is entitled to 
receive from the proceeds of the sale of the 1995 Harley Davidson, 
the sum of $4,700. 
65. The Court finds that the 2000 Harley Davidson motorcycle 
is presently in the possession of respondent. [Testimony of 
petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
66. The Court finds that the 2000 Harley Davidson has the 
average retail price of $19,000. [Petitioner's Exhibit 12] 
67. The Court finds that the respondent testified that the 
2000 Harley Davidson's value is $16,000 and in other documents 
submitted to the Court conceded that the motorcycle's value is 
$18,000. [Testimony of respondent, respondent's Exhibit "Q"] 
68. Said motorcycle payoff is $5,452. 
69. Petitioner should be awarded a sum equal to one-half the* 
equity in said Harley Davidson, less $4,700. 
70. Respondent should be awarded the 1992 Ford truck and 
petitioner should be awarded one-half the equity of $7,500, or 
$3,750. 
71. The Court finds that the line of credit secured by a 
trust deed has not been substantially reduced from its original 
balance of $19,693.47 as of the date of trial; and, the balance 
stands at $18,187.97. [Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 26, 1] 
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72. The Court finds that respondent has controlled the line 
of credit, and on occasion has drawn against it, as he deemed 
necessary. [Testimony of respondent, petitioner's Exhibit 1] 
73. The Court finds that the petitioner did not know of the 
additional advances against the line of credit, or approve these 
draws. [Testimony of petitioner] 
74. The Court finds that the parties have substantially 
divided all personal property between them and that said division 
is fair and reasonable. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of 
respondent] 
75. The Court finds that each party has requested a few 
remaining items of property from the other of a sentimental nature, 
including the petitioner's request for the skating rink Christmas 
decoration, the skinny Christmas tree, all ornaments with Jason or 
petitioner's name on them, one of the old-time Santas, the mirror 
over the stairway, and the rug in the basement TV room which was 
given to her as a gift. The respondent has requested the return of 
a Taylor Made driver, having a value of $250, which he alleged was 
missing when he returned to the residence, and a children's 
carousel belonging to his daughter. [Testimony of respondent] 
76. The Court finds that the petitioner denies having those 
items of property or that she has disposed of the same. [Testimony 
of petitioner] 
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77. The Court finds that the petitioner, in order to subsist, 
has been required to borrow funds from her parents and to sell 
items of her personal property, including a diamond ring. The 
petitioner testified that she sold the ring and received the sum of 
$500. The petitioner purchased the ring for $2,400, and was 
appraised for insurance purposes at $4,500. [Testimony of 
petitioner, respondent's Exhibit 1] 
78. The Court finds that the sale of the ring for $500 was 
less than the ring's actual value. 
79. The Court finds that detailed testimony was not elicited 
regarding the actual value of hand tools, compressors, table saws, 
and other items of property which remained in the respondent's 
possession, which the petitioner alleged was equal to the value of 
the ring. [Testimony of Claudia Benson] 
80. The Court finds that each party has submitted a Financial 
Declaration setting forth what they believe to be their reasonable 
living expenses and incomes. [Petitioner's Exhibit 21, respondent's 
Exhibit "Q"] 
81. The Court finds that the petitioner's Financial 
Declaration has living expenses of $3,519.30, which the Court finds 
to be very fair and reasonable. [Petitioner's Exhibit 21] 
82. The Court finds that the petitioner purchased a Hyundai 
Tiberon from Westland Ford on November 4, 2000, doing so at the 
i 
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request and demand of the respondent in order to remove him from 
the obligation of the 2000 Hyundai Elantra which had been acquired 
by the parties approximately one year earlier. [Testimony of 
petitioner] 
83. The Court finds that the trade-in allowance of $12,000 
was equal to the debt owing on the car. [Petitioner's Exhibit 22] 
84. The Court finds that there is no marital equity in the 
present Hyundai automobile. [Testimony of petitioner, petitioner's 
Exhibit 22] 
85. The Court finds that the monthly payment on the Hyundai 
Tiberon is equal to the Hyundai Elantra, and that the exchange did 
not increase the petitioner's reasonable and necessary living 
expenses. [Testimony of petitioner, petitioner's Exhibit 22] 
86. The Court finds that the petitioner's current monthly 
gross income is the sum of $2,680.78. [Testimony of petitioner, 
petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 13, 21] 
87. The Court finds that the petitioner in claiming child 
support of $235.54 overstated the amount of child support that she 
is receiving. [Petitioner's Exhibit 21] 
88. The Court finds that the actual amount of income the 
petitioner has received for the reporting period of January 1-June 
2001, was the sum of $416.20, at $69.36 per month. [Respondent's 
Exhibit "S"] 
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89. The Court finds that the actual amount of child support 
amortized over the period of 1995-present is the sum of $116 per 
month. 
90. The Court finds that the petitioner has overstated her 
monthly net and gross income by $116. 
91. The Court finds that the petitioner's actual monthly 
gross income from all sources is $2,697.32, that petitioner has 
standard deductions of $578.66, and a net monthly income of 
$2,218.66, rather than $2,334.66 as set forth on petitioner's 
Exhibit 21. 
92. The Court finds that the petitioner failed to disclose a 
bank account with Goldenwest Credit Union in Ogden, Utah, which as 
of November 1, 2001, had a balance of $862.70. [Respondents 
Exhibit "M"] 
93. The Court finds that the failure to disclose said account 
may affect the petitioner's credibility before the Court. 
94. The Court finds that respondent submitted an amended 
Financial Declaration. [Respondent's Exhibit MQ"] 
95. The Court finds that the respondent asserts a gross 
monthly income of $4,804 from his employment as a firefighter. 
96. The Court finds that the respondent claims no exemptions 
and has an actual filing status of two exemptions. [Testimony of 
respondent] 
O.0 0 
SHAW V. SHAW PAGE 20 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
97. The Court finds that the respondent claims no income from 
secondary employment. [Respondent's Exhibit "Q"] 
98. The Court finds that in addition to standard deductions, 
respondent pays child support for two children from a prior 
marriage of $525 per month. [Respondent's Exhibit "Q"] 
99. The Court finds that respondent claimed a net monthly 
income from his primary employment of $2,734.96 in his Financial 
Declaration. [Testimony of respondent, respondent's Exhibit "Q"] 
100. The Court finds that the respondent has misrepresented 
and misstated his actual net monthly income from his primary 
employment, which the Court finds to be $3,170 per month. 
[Respondent's Exhibit "P"] 
101. The Court finds that at the present time, respondent is 
paying the first and second mortgage obligations on the Appian Way 
home, which he occupies and which is listed for sale. 
102. The Court finds the mortgage obligations total $1,676. 
[Respondent's Exhibit "Q"] 
103. The Court finds that the $1,676 does not represent a 
reasonable and necessary future living expense for the respondent, 
a single man, and his children when they visit for two weeks per 
year, and that a reasonable amount for a living expense for 
respondent would be an amount similar to the petitioner's claimed 
expense of $925 per month. 
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104. The Court finds that upon the sale of the home, the 
respondent will have additional disposable income of $751. 
105. The Court finds that respondent has further overstated 
his living expenses and the amount set forth for food and household 
supplies of $350 per month is unreasonable given the respondent's 
employment as a firefighter and his work schedule of 24 hours on, 
24 hours off* 
106. The Court finds that the respondent eats a percentage of 
his meals at the fire station, and his meals are subsidized by 
income tax deductions. [Testimony of Barbara Underhill, CPA, 
petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 15, 17 and 18] 
107. The Court finds that the petitioner has a monthly 
shortfall of $1,300.64, between her net income and her needs. 
108. The Court finds that petitioner has established a need 
for alimony. 
109. The Court finds that respondent has consistently 
maintained secondary employment throughout the marriage and that 
said secondary employment was used by the parties for living 
expenses, travel, vacations and to otherwise maintain their 
lifestyle. [Testimony of petitioner, testimony of respondent] 
110. The Court finds that the respondent ceased secondary 
employment in December 2000, has not sought secondary employment, 
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and has testified that he is not intending to, nor does he believe 
that he should be obligated to seek or accept secondary employment. 
111. The Court finds that only respondent's income from his 
principal employment should be imputed to him. 
112. The Court finds that the adjustments made to the 
respondent's living expenses for food and household supplies, 
reducing said sum to $150 from $350 claimed, reducing entertainment 
by $100, and eliminating the timeshare payments will result in an 
immediate savings to respondent of $656 per month. 
113. The Court finds that upon sale of the house, an 
additional $751 in savings will be realized. 
114. The Court finds that the respondent will have increased 
net earnings of $1,351 per month when the home sells 
115. The Court finds that the actual and necessary living 
expenses of respondent upon sale of the house should be the sum of 
$2,576. 
116. The Court finds that the respondent's present net income 
of $3,171.88, without secondary employment, is in excess of that 
needed for his actual living expense when the home sells. 
117. The Court finds that the respondent has the financial 
ability to pay spousal support from current and imputed earnings. 
118. The Court finds that a reasonable sum for alimony is the 
sum of $250 per month. 
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119. After sale of the home, the alimony should increase to 
$500 per month, and be paid for a period equal to the duration of 
the marriage. 
120. Petitioner claimed the $8,054.52 balance on the Citibank 
credit card existed prior to the parties9 separation and is a 
marital expense which the parties should share. Petitioner failed 
to disclose the account on earlier Financial Declarations and in 
discovery. Respondent testified he was unaware of the account 
until the morning of trial. Because petitioner offered no credible 
evidence the account balance pre-existed the parties1 separation 
and as a sanction for petitioner's failure to disclose the account 
in discovery, petitioner shall be solely responsible for the 
Citibank credit card. 
Petitioner obtained the Discover Card and incurred its 
present balance after the parties1 separation. Petitioner shall be 
solely responsible for the Discover Card balance. 
Petitioner obtained the R.C. Willey account and incurred 
its present balance after the parties1 separation. Petitioner 
shall be solely responsible for its balance. 
Petitioner obtained the Granite Furniture account and 
incurred its present balance after the parties1 separation* 
Petitioner shall be solely responsible for its balance. 
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Petitioner obtained the Lowe's account and incurred its 
present balance after the parties1 separation. Petitioner shall be 
solely responsible for its balance. 
Petitioner obtained the Dell Computers account and 
incurred its present balance after the parties1 separation. 
Petitioner shall be solely responsible for its balance. 
Petitioner shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the 2001 Hyundai and 2001 Ford truck. 
Petitioner shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the West Jordan condominium. 
121. Respondent shall be solely liable for the Discover Card 
in his name. 
Respondent shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the 2000 Harley Davidson motorcycle and 1992 
Ford truck. 
122. Both parties9 testimony and exhibits showed a significant 
lack of credibility. 
123. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees which each 
party incurs to effect dissolution of the parties1 marriage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to this Court's jurisdiction. 
2. In lieu of alimony and to remedy the petitioner's 
contempt, the Court may adjust distribution of real and personal 
property at the time the marriage is dissolved. 
3. The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce on 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
4. The parties shall sell the house and divide the proceeds 
equally, after the following offsets: 
(a) Respondent is awarded $4,290 (down payment on first 
house); 
(b) Respondent is awarded $2,200 (house sale repairs); 
(c) Petitioner is awarded equity from respondents 
Harley (Findings para. 69); 
(d) Petitioner is awarded the equity from the truck 
($3,750) if the proceeds from the sale of the house are inadequate 
to cover the foregoing awards then consequences shall be divided 
equally. 
5. Personal property, including bank accounts as divided, 
except as set forth in Findings para. 75. 
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Counsel for petitioner is to prepare the appropriate Findings 
and Decree. 
Dated this ™ day of November, 2001. 
STEPHEN L. HENRI 
DISTRICT COURT 
am 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this g/ffi day of November, 2001: 
James I. Watts 
Attorney for Petitioner 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gayanne K. Schmid 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Attorneys for Respondent 
68 S. Main Street, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
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JAMES I. WATTS (4768) T , ^ 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 " l •'•'«•.• 
OLD SALT LAKE STOCK & MINING BLDG. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel (801) 994-0838 
Fax (801) 994-0833 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA SHAW, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SCOTT SHAW, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 004907136 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
This matter having come on regularly for trial pursuant to Notice before the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henroid on October 29 and 30. 2001, Melissa J. Shaw appearing in person and 
represented by James I. Watts, and the respondent Scott Shaw appearing in person 
and represented by Richard G. Hackwell, the Court having received exhibits, taken testimony of 
the parties and their respective witnesses, received and heard the arguments of counsel, and 
otherwise being fully advised, hereby enters its FINDINGS OF FACT : 
1. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-3-4(1), and that venue is proper. 
2. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Salt Lake County for at least 
three months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint for divorce in this action. 
3. The Court finds that the petitioner and respondent were married on August 9, 1993, in 
Sturgis, South Dakota. 
4. The Court finds that the parties separated on or about January 11, 2001 following the 
filing of the Complaint. 
5. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have arisen in the marriage, which 
makes continuation of a viable marriage an impossibility. 
6. The Court finds that there have been no children born of this marriage and none are 
expected. 
7. The Court finds that the parties have entered into a partial stipulation, resolving 
certain matters raised by way of petitioner's Petition, the Court finds said stipulation to be fair 
and reasonable and does adopt the same. 
8. The Court finds the parties' stipulation to be as follows: 
(a) That all retirement accounts and pensions owned by the parties shall be 
divided between them pursuant to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order, in accordance 
with the Woodward formula. 
(b) That the Order pertains to each and every retirement account or pension 
owned by the parties as of this date, which should include the petitioner's and the 
respondent's retirements from Redrock Brewing Company and the respondent's 
retirement account 401k and 457 account with the State Retirement Systems, 
Firefighters' Department. 
(c) That the parties' marital residence located at 5349 S. Appian Way, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, has been listed for sale at the appraised price of $160,000 and 
should be sold. 
(d) That the respondent is awarded the use and possession of the residence 
during the pendency of the sale. 
(e) That the respondent shall not make any alterations, modifications or 
improvements to the home that would cost more than $100 without the specific 
authorization or approval of the petitioner. 
(f) That any modifications or repairs made by him will be the respondents sole 
financial responsibility, unless such written approval is obtained in advance of 
making said improvements 
(g) That the petitioner and respondent will cooperate in all respects in order to 
market the residence, to include if necessary, the placing of a lockbox on the residence to 
allow access at times when he is not otherwise able to be at the residence or would render 
the listing agent unable to show the residence. 
9. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage the parties have acquired an 
interest in two parcels of real property and an interest in two timeshares 
10. The Court finds that the parties acquired a home at 5524 South 3535 West, 
Taylorsville Utah, on or about April 28, 1993. 
11. The Court finds that the purchase price for the 3535 West home was $72,500. 
12 The Court finds that there was no down payment made by the parties, which reduced 
the purchase price or created any immediate equity in the property. 
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13. The Court finds that the sum of $4,290.20 in settlement charges representing loan 
origination fees, appraisal fees, credit report, mortgage insurance, and other costs typically borne 
by a purchaser were paid by the respondent. 
14. The Court finds that the respondent immediately moved into the home and that the 
petitioner moved into the residence some two weeks later. 
15. The Court finds that from May 1993, the petitioner was employed on a full-time 
basis, and that her earnings and respondent's earnings were utilized to pay common household 
expenses, including mortgage, taxes, food, insurance, utilities, entertainment, and all other living 
expenses. 
16. The Court finds that the real property located at 5524 South 3535 West was sold in 
or about 1996. 
17. The Court finds that the proceeds derived from the sale of the 5524 South 3535 West 
property represented equity that had been created as a result of improvements made to the 
residence which were paid for by both parties, as well as general property value appreciation. 
18. The Court finds the net equity from the sale of the residence to be the sum of 
$15,000. 
19. The Court finds that the respondent utilized $7,500 of the $15,000 amount to pay off 
a loan secured by his Jeep Cherokee automobile. 
20. The Court finds that the remaining $7,500 was used as a down payment on the real 
property located at 5349 S. Appian Way, which the parties thereafter occupied as their marital 
residence. 
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21. The Court finds that the respondent should be allowed $4,290 as a credit for his 
separate property contribution to the parties' prior residence at 5525 South 3535 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, because the parties used a portion of the sale proceeds of the 3535 West residence to 
acquire the marital residence and used the balance of the sale proceeds of the 3535 West 
residence to satisfy other marital obligations. 
22. The Court finds that during the entire period of ownership of the Appian Way home, 
the petitioner was employed on a full-time basis outside of the home, that the respondent was 
employed on a full-time basis by Salt Lake City Fire Department, and that during the entire 
period of the marriage (August 1993-December 2001). that the respondent had secondary 
employment as a licensed general contractor, maintenance/handyman or as an employee 
of Redrock Brewing Company doing maintenance work. 
23. The Court finds that the parties used all income earned from all sources for common 
living expenses, including mortgage, taxes, food, utilities, travel, and all other needs of the 
family. 
24. The Court finds that during the period that the parties resided at the Appian Way 
property, the home was occupied by the petitioner, the petitioner's son from a prior marriage 
Jason, now age 17, the Respondent, and two large dogs. 
25. The Court finds that during the period of occupancy of the Appian Way property 
that certain improvements were made to the property, including partial re-carpeting of the 
bedrooms in 1996, and the installation of a small in-ground pool. 
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26. The Court finds that the respondent, in or about the years 1999-2000, removed the 
stairs from the deck of the house and started to install a used hot tub in the rear yard, and in the 
process of said work removed the cement patio in the rear of the home. 
27. The Court finds that as of this date, the work to restore or repair the rear of the home 
has not been completed. 
28. The Court finds that the petitioner, following the filing of the Complaint, did file a 
Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking temporary Orders, which was to be heard on or about 
January 10,2001. 
29. The Court finds that at the hearing of petitioner's Motion, the parties entered into a 
stipulation resolving the issues raised by petitioner's Motion, which stipulation was 
memorialized in the Minutes of the Law and Motion hearing and in an Order of the Court 
30. The Court finds that the respondent was ordered to vacate the residence by January 
14, 2001; the Court awarded exclusive use of the real property to the petitioner and her minor 
son, Jason, during the pendency of these proceedings; and, the respondent was to have use of the 
shed during the day in order to obtain tools. 
31. The Court finds that from and after January 4 until July 7, 2001, the petitioner did 
occupy the residence with her son, Jason. 
32. The Court finds that from February 2001-June 2001, the respondent made the first 
and second mortgage payments pursuant to the parties' stipulation and the Orders of the Court. 
33. The Court finds that the petitioner vacated the residence on July 7, 2001, and that the 
respondent took possession on July 11, 2001. 
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34. The Court finds that the carpet in the living room, dining room, hallways and stairs is 
between 10-12 years in age. 
35. The Court finds that the petitioner moved from the marital residence on or about 
Saturday July 1 2001, but that the petitioner did not inform respondent she had moved from the 
home. Over the next few days, respondent heard through friends petitioner had moved. On 
Tuesday, July 10, 2001, respondent became concerned for the two dogs apparently alone at the 
marital residence and inquired through counsel whether petitioner had moved. Respondent 
received his clearance to enter the marital residence on Wednesday, July 11, 2001. Respondent 
entered the home that afternoon with Claudia Bennion Respondent and Bennion found the dogs 
unsupervised in the marital residence with an automatic feeder and water dish. Respondent and 
Bennion found the marital residence filthy and in disrepair. The carpets were badly soiled and 
rank with dog urine and feces The back yard was deep in dog feces. The back yard had 
overgrown and then died out. On October 1, 2001, on respondent's Order to Show Cause, the 
Court ordered the petitioner to pay $3,345 toward the carpet. Respondent paid $1,201.33 toward 
the replacement of the carpet. Respondent paid an additional $202.50 for sod. Respondent 
contributed labor to lay the sod at a value of $200. Respondent contributed an additional 40 
hours of labor to clean the martial residence after he regained occupancy on July 11, 2001, for an 
additional credit of $600, which represents 40 hours at $15 per hour. Respondent s total 
advances to repair and clean the marital residence after he re-took possession on July 11 2001 is 
the sum of $2.203.83. 
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36. The Court finds that the petitioner has paid the sum of $3,331 to Carpet One for the 
replacement of the carpet in the home. 
37. The Court finds that the petitioner, in order to make said payment, was required to 
borrow such funds from Linda Tobin, and that the petitioner is obligated to Ms. Tobin for said 
loan. 
38. The Court finds that prior to vacating the residence on January 14, 2000, the 
respondent, in an effort to deprive the petitioner of access to tools, rakes, shovels and other items 
necessary to maintain the residence, yard and sprinkling system, did construct an artificial wall in 
the garage, behind which the tools were secured. 
39. The Court finds that the respondent did further screw shut a closet within the home, 
behind which other tools commonly used to maintain and keep up the residence were stored. 
40. The Court finds that the respondent also padlocked the pool house door where 
pumps, filters, chlorine and chemicals necessary to properly maintain the in ground pool were 
stored. 
41. The Court finds that Petitioner did not take care of the house during her period of 
occupancy as well as contemplated in the Court's Order, but did not trash the residence to the 
extent claimed by the Respondent, likewise, the Respondent, except for the acts set forth in 
paragraphs 38, 39, and 40 above, did not reduce the value of the home during his occupancy. 
42. The Court finds that the equity within the home is marital property, and that any 
equity derived from the sale of the residence shall be equally divided between the parties. 
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43. The Court finds that in addition to the marital residence, the parties have an interest 
in two timeshares, to wit: Trendwest and the Marriott Mountainside Project in Park City, Utah. 
44. The Court finds that during the marriage the parties acquired two timeshare accounts, 
an interest in Marriott Mountainside in Park City, Utah, with a monthly payment of $250, and a 
WorldMart timeshare with a monthly payment of $150. Neither has any market value. 
Respondent shall be awarded the timeshare accounts subject to all indebtedness thereon. 
45. The Court finds that any sums the parties once held jointly already have been divided 
as they desire and the parties presently have no joint bank accounts 
46. The Court finds that each party should be awarded any life insurance policy which 
the party presently maintains and may change the beneficiary as the party desires. 
47. The Court finds that for the year 1998, the petitioner and respondent filed joint 
income tax returns and had income from wages, salaries and tips of $83,842. 
48. The Court finds that for the year 1999, the petitioner and respondent filed joint 
income tax returns and had income from wages, salaries and tips of $98,587. 
49. The Court finds that for the year 2000, the petitioner filed an individual tax return 
and had income from wages, salaries and tips of $33,401. 
50. The Court finds that for the year 2000, the respondent filed an individual income tax 
return and had income from wages, salaries and tips of $79,684. 
51. The Court finds that the petitioner's median income for the years 1998, 1999 and 
2000, is the sum of $29,549. 
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52. The Court finds that the respondent's median income for the years 1998, 1999, and 
2000 is the sum of $67,351. 
53. The Court finds that the respondent's median income is 2.27 times greater than the 
petitioner's median income. 
54. The Court finds that the petitioner, in filing her individual 2000 tax return, allocated 
the deduction for mortgage interest and property taxes equally between herself and the 
respondent. 
55. The Court finds that the respondent, in filing his individual 2000 income tax returns 
claimed 100% of all mortgage interest deductions, deductions for the Marriott and Trendwest 
timeshares, and real property taxes. 
56. The Court finds that the respondent likewise claimed an employee business expense 
for miles driven, claiming 7,488 miles, which the Court finds to be unreasonable, unsupported, 
and may constitute tax fraud. 
57. The Court finds that the parties are at an increased risk of audit and financial loss 
unless an amended 2000 tax return is prepared and filed by the respondent. 
58. The Court finds that an amended tax return should be filed forthwith by the 
respondent, claiming only one-half of the mortgage interest deductions, property taxes and other 
deductions which should properly be allocated between the parties. 
59. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage the parties have acquired 
interests in certain vehicles, including a 1995 Harley Davidson, a 2000 Harley Davidson and a 
1992 Ford F250 truck. 
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60. The Court finds that in 1998, the parties borrowed the sum of $19,683.47 from 
Mountain America Credit Union, securing the loan by the parties' Appian Way real property. 
61. The Court finds that the proceeds were used to pay and satisfy Mountain America 
Credit Union's loans, which had been obtained to acquire the 1992 Ford truck, and the 1995 
Harley Davidson. 
62. The Court finds that the petitioner, in or about July 2001, sold the 1995 Harley 
Davidson to Harley Davidson of Salt Lake for the sum of $9,400. 
63. The Court finds that the $9,400 received by the petitioner represents fair and 
reasonable compensation for a 1995 Harley Davidson motorcycle in like condition and repair. 
64. The Court finds that the respondent is entitled to receive from the proceeds of the 
sale of the 1995 Harley Davidson the sum of $4,700. 
65. The Court finds that the 2000 Harley Davidson motorcycle is presently in the 
possession of respondent. 
66. The Court finds that the 2000 Harley Davidson has the average retail price of 
$19,000. 
67. The Court finds that the respondent testified that the 2000 Harley Davidson 
Motorcycle's value is $16,000 and in other documents submitted to the Court the respondent 
conceded that the motorcycle's value is $18,000. 
68. The Court finds the loan payoff for the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle to be 
$5,452. 
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69. The Court finds the Petitioner should be awarded a sum equal to one-half the equity 
in said Harley Davidson, less $4,700. ($19,000 -$5,542 payoff = $13,548 -$4,700 [sale of 1995 
Harley] =$8,848 + 2 = $4,424). 
70. The Court finds the Respondent should be awarded the 1992 Ford truck, and that the 
respondent should receive lA equity in said truck, or $3,750, the Court finding the vehicle value 
to be $7,500. 
71. The Court finds that the line of credit secured by a trust deed has not been 
substantially reduced from its original balance of $19,693.47 as of the date of trial; and, the 
balance stands at $18,187.97. 
72. The Court finds that respondent has controlled the line of credit, and on occasion has 
drawn against it as he deemed necessary. 
73. The Court finds that the petitioner did not know of the additional advances against 
the line of credit or approved these draws. 
74. The Court finds that the parties have substantially divided all personal property 
between them and that said division is fair and reasonable. 
75. The Court finds that each party has requested a few remaining items of property from 
the other of a sentimental nature, including the petitioner's request for the skating rink Christmas 
decoration, the skinny Christmas tree, all ornaments with Jason or petitioner's name on them, one 
of the old-time Santas, the mirror over the stairway, and the rug in the basement TV room which 
was given to her as a gift. The respondent has requested the return of a Taylor Made driver, 
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having a value of $250, which he alleged was missing when he returned to the residence and a 
children's carousel belonging to his daughter. 
76. The Court finds that the petitioner denies having those items of property or that she 
has disposed of the same. 
77. The Court finds that the petitioner, in order to subsist, has been required to borrow 
funds from her parents and to sell items of her personal property, including a diamond ring. The 
petitioner testified that she sold the ring and received the sum of $500. The petitioner purchased 
the ring for $2,400, and was appraised for insurance purposes at $4,500. 
78. The Court finds that the sale of the ring for $500 was less than the ring's actual value. 
79. The Court finds that detailed testimony was not elicited regarding the actual value of 
hand tools, compressors, table saws, and other items of property which remained in the 
respondent's possession, which the petitioner alleged was equal to the value of the ring. 
80. The Court finds that each party has submitted a Financial Declaration setting forth 
what they believe to be their reasonable living expenses and incomes. 
81. The Court finds that the petitioner's Financial Declaration has living expenses of 
$3,519.30, which the Court finds to be very fair and reasonable. 
82. The Court finds that the petitioner purchased a Hyundai Tiberon from Westland Ford 
on November 4, 2000, doing so at the request and demand of the Respondent in order to remove 
him from the financial obligation secured by the 2000 Hyundai Elantra, which had been acquired 
by the parties approximately one year earlier. 
83. The Court finds that the trade-in allowance of $12,000 was equal to the debt owing 
on the car. 
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84. The Court finds that there is no marital equity in the present Hyundai automobile. 
85. The Court finds that the monthly payment on the Hyundai Tiberon is equal to the 
Hyundai Elantra, and that the exchange did not increase the petitioner's reasonable and necessary 
living expenses. 
86. The Court finds that the petitioner's current monthly gross income is the sum of 
$2,680.78. 
87. The Court finds that the petitioner, in claiming child support of $235.54 
overstated the amount of child support that she is receiving. 
88. The Court finds that the actual amount of income the petitioner has received for 
the reporting period of January 1 - June 2001, was the sum of $416.20, at $69.36 per month. 
89. The Court finds that the actual amount of child support amortized over the period 
of 1995-present, is the sum of $116 per month. 
90. The Court finds that the petitioner, on the trial exhibits, overstated her monthly net 
and gross income by $116. 
91. The Court finds that the petitioner's actual monthly gross income from all sources is 
$2,697.32, that petitioner has standard deductions of $578.66, and a net monthly income of 
$2,218.66, rather than $2,334.66. 
92. The Court finds that the petitioner failed to disclose a bank account with Goldenwest 
Credit Union in Ogden, Utah, which as of November 1, 2001, had a balance of $862.70. 
93. The Court finds that the failure to disclose said account may affect the petitioner's 
credibility before the Court. 
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94. The Court finds that respondent submitted and the Court received, as an exhibit, an 
amended Financial Declaration. 
95. The Court finds that the respondent asserts a gross monthly income of $4,804 from 
his employment as a Firefighter. 
96. The Court finds that the respondent claims no exemptions and has an actual filing 
status of two exemptions. 
97. The Court finds that the respondent claims no income from secondary employment. 
98. The Court finds that in addition to standard deductions, respondent pays child 
support for two children from a prior marriage of $525 per month. 
99 The Court finds that respondent claimed on his amended financial declaration a net 
monthly income from his primary employment of $2,734.96. 
100. The Court finds that the respondent has misrepresented and misstated his actual 
monthly income from his primary employment, which the Court finds to be $3,171.88 per 
month. 
101. The Court finds that at the present time, respondent is paying the first and second 
mortgage obligations on the Appian Way home, which he occupies and which is listed for sale. 
102. The Court finds the mortgage obligations total $1,676 per month. 
103. Court finds that the $1,676 does not represent a reasonable and necessary future 
living expense for the respondent, a single man who's children visit for two weeks per year, and 
that a reasonable amount for a living expense for respondent would be an amount similar to the 
petitioner's claimed expense of $925 per month. 
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104. The Court finds that upon the sale of the home the respondent will have additional 
disposable income of $751. 
105. The Court finds that respondent has further overstated his living expenses and the 
amount set forth for food and household supplies of $350 per month is unreasonable given the 
respondent's employment as a firefighter and his work schedule of 24 hours on 24 hours off. 
106. The Court finds that the respondent eats a percentage of his meals at the fire station, 
and his meals are subsidized by income tax deductions. 
107. The Court finds that the petitioner has a monthly shortfall of $1,300.64, between her 
net income and her needs. 
108. The Court finds that petitioner has established a need for alimony. 
109. The Court finds that respondent has consistently maintained secondary employment 
throughout the marriage and that said secondary employment was used by the parties for living 
expenses, travel, vacations, and to otherwise maintain their lifestyle 
110. The Court finds that the respondent ceased secondary employment in December 
2000, has not sought secondary employment, and has testified that he is not intending to, nor 
does he believe that he should be obligated to seek or accept secondary employment. 
111. The Court finds that only respondent's income from his principal employment 
should be imputed to him for purposes of alimony 
112. The Court finds that the adjustments made to the respondent's living expenses for 
food and household supplies, reducing said sum to $150 from $350 claimed, reducing 
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entertainment by $100, and eliminating the timeshare payment will result in an immediate 
savings to respondent of $656 per month. 
113. The Court finds that upon sale of the house, an additional $751 in savings will be 
realized. 
114. The Court finds that the respondent will have increased net earnings of $1,351 per 
month when the home sells. 
115. The Court finds that the actual and necessary living expenses of respondent upon 
sale of the house should be the sum of $2,576. 
116. The Court finds that the respondent's present net income of $3,171.88, without 
secondary employment, is in excess of that needed for his actual living expense when the home 
sells. 
117. The Court finds that the respondent has the financial ability to pay spousal support 
from current and imputed earnings. 
118. The Court finds that a reasonable sum for alimony is the sum of $250 per month. 
119. The Court finds that upon the sale of the residence, alimony should increase to $500 
per month, and be paid for a period equal to the duration of the marriage. 
120. The Court finds that the petitioner claimed the $8,054.52 balance on the Citibank 
Credit Card existed prior to the parties' separation and is a marital expense that the parties should 
share. Petitioner failed to disclose the account on earlier Financial Declarations in discovery. 
Respondent testified he was unaware of the account until the morning of trial. 
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121. The Court finds that because petitioner offered no credible evidence the account 
balance pre-existed the parties' separation and as a sanction for petitioner's failure to disclose the 
account in discovery, petitioner shall be solely responsible for the Citibank Credit Card. 
122. The Court finds that the petitioner obtained the Discover Card and incurred its 
present balance after the parties separation. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for the 
Discover Card balance. 
123. The Court finds that the petitioner obtained the R.C. Willey account and incurred its 
present balance after the parties' separation. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for its 
balance. 
124. The Court finds that the petitioner obtained the Granite Furniture account and 
incurred its present balance after the parties' separation. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for 
its balance. 
125. The Court finds that the petitioner obtained the Lowe's account and incurred its 
present balance after the parties' separation. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for its balance. 
126. The Court finds that the petitioner obtained the Dell Computers account and 
incurred its present balance after the parties' separation. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for 
its balance. 
127. The Court finds that the petitioner shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the 2001 Hyundai. 
128. The Court finds that the petitioner shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the West Jordan condominium. 
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129. The Court finds that the respondent shall be solely liable for the Discover Card in 
his name. 
130. The Court finds that the respondent shall be solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the 2000 Harley Davidson motorcycle and the 1992 Ford F250 truck. 
131. The Court finds that both parties' testimony and exhibits showed a significant lack 
of credibility. 
132. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded the right to take her maiden 
name of Frank, if she so desires. 
133. The Court finds that each party shall pay their own attorney's fees, which each party 
incurs, to effect dissolution of the parties' marriage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties, subject matter, and 
that venue is proper. 
2. The Court concludes that the petitioner, Melissa Shaw should be granted a Decree 
of Divorce from the respondent and the same to become final upon entry. 
3. The Court concludes that irreconcilable differences have arisen making a 
continuation of the marriage an impossibility. 
4. The Court concludes that there have been no children born of this marriage and 
that none are expected. 
5. The Court concludes that the parties have acquired interest in real, personal, 
tangible, intangible and other properties, the sum of which were divided by Stipulation of the 
parties, and other items ordered divided in accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law as entered by the Court following trial in this matter. 
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RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
6. The Court concludes that the parties' various retirement benefits of all kinds 401 k 
or 457 with Redrock Brewing Company and or the State of Utah Retirement Systems, 
Firefighters Retirement should be divided pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order in 
accordance with the Woodward Formula. 
REAL PROPERTY 
7. The Court concludes that the real property presently owned by the parties located 
at 5349 S. Appian Way, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, should be immediately listed for sale 
and sold and that the initial listing price shall be the appraised value of $160,000. 
8. The Court concludes that during the pendency of the sale and pursuant to the 
parties' Stipulation, the respondent shall be entitled to the exclusive use and possession of the 
property, that no alterations, modifications or improvements to the home costing more than $100 
shall be made by the respondent without authorization or approval by the petitioner, that any 
modification or repair made by the respondent shall be his sole financial responsibility unless 
written approval is obtained in advance from the petitioner. 
9. The Court concludes that the parties shall cooperate with one another in the 
marketing and sale of the residence. 
10. The Court concludes that the respondent paid the sum of $4,290.20 in settlement 
charges, loan origination fees, appraisal fees, and other costs typically born by a purchaser in the 
acquisition of the parties' first home located at 5524 South 3535 West, Taylorsville, Utah, which 
was acquired on or about April 28, 1993. 
11. The Court concludes that the respondent should be entitled to a return of the 
$4,290.20 from the proceeds derived from the sale of the Appian Way property. 
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12. The Court concludes that all of the equity which existed in the 5524 South 3535 
West property, sold in 1996, was the result of improvements made to the residence and paid for 
by both parties as well as general property value appreciation. 
13. The Court concludes that $7,500 of the proceeds from the sale of the 5524 South 
3535 West property was used as a down payment on the Appian Way property. 
14. The Court concludes that there have been numerous improvements made to the 
Appian Way property, which were paid for by both the parties. 
15. The Court concludes that the parties' earnings, from all sources, were likewise 
used to pay common living expenses to include: taxes, mortgage, food, utilities, travel and other 
family needs. 
16. The Court concludes that from January 14, 2001 until July 7, 2001 the petitioner 
occupied the Appian Way residence with her son Jason, and that the respondent has had 
possession of the residence from July 11, 2001, to the time of the trial. 
17. The Court concludes that the petitioner has paid the sum of $3,331 to Carpet One, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for carpet replacement in the Appian Way home and that the respondent 
has paid or been credited with paying the sum of $2,203.83 in improving or repairing the home. 
18. The Court concludes that the parties have equally shared in the cost of 
maintaining and improving the residence, that neither party has caused substantial waste to the 
property and that the proceeds from the sale of the Appian Way home shall be divided evenly 
between the parties after offsets and credits as set forth within the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law. 
19. The Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to be paid from respondent's 
portion of the sale proceeds of the marital residence, the sum of $4,424 representing Vz of the 
equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson which the Court has awarded to the respondent. 
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20. The Court concludes that the respondent should be paid from the gross sales 
proceeds the sum of $4,290 representing costs paid by respondent on the parties first home. 
22. The Court concludes that the petitioner is to be awarded, from the sale of the 
marital residence, the sum of $3,750 representing V2 of the equity in the 1992 Ford Truck, which 
the respondent retains. 
23. The Court concludes that each party should be entitled to retain, as his or her 
separate property, all items of personal property in his or her possession, free and clear of claim 
of the other. 
24. The Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to retain as her separate 
property, the Hyundai Tiberon acquired by her on November 4, 2000, and that there does not 
exist in the vehicle any marital equity. 
25. The Court concludes that during the marriage the parties acquired interest in two 
timeshares, to wit: Trendwest Timeshare and a Marriott Mountainside Timeshare in Park City, 
Utah. 
26. The Court concludes that the respondent is entitled to those timeshares, that there 
is no equity therein, and that the respondent shall pay, assume, and discharge the obligations 
secured thereby and holding the petitioner harmless there from. 
27. The Court concludes that the petitioner's necessary living expenses are the sum of 
$3,519.30. 
28. The Court concludes that the petitioner's actual monthly gross income, from all 
sources, is $2,697.32, and that the petitioner's net monthly income from all sources including 
child support, is the sum of $2,218.66. 
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29. The Court concludes that the respondent has a gross income of $4,804 and a net 
monthly income of $3,170. 
30. The Court concludes that the respondent overstated his reasonable and necessary 
living expenses. 
34. The Court concludes that upon the sale of the Appian Way residence and after 
corrections for over-stated expenses as detailed in the Court's Findings of Fact, that the 
respondent will have an additional $1,351 in disposable income. 
32. The Court concludes that the petitioner will have a monthly shortfall of $1,364 
between her net income and her necessary living expenses. 
33. The Court concludes that the respondent's median income is 2.27 times greater 
than the petitioner's median income as demonstrated through tax returns for the years 1998, 1999 
and 2000. 
34. The Court concludes that there is a gross disparity in the earnings and the earning 
capabilities of the parties that the petitioner has demonstrated a need for spousal support and 
alimony, that the respondent has the ability to pay and therefore concludes that the respondent 
shall pay alimony to the petitioner. 
35. The Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled and that the respondent is 
obligated to pay the sum of $250 per month in alimony commencing December 2001 and 
continuing until such time as the marital residence is sold, upon the sale of the marital residence 
the alimony obligation shall increase (without necessity for any further hearings) to the sum of 
$500 per month and shall be paid for a period equal to the duration of the marriage. 
36. The Court concludes that the respondent should pay the Court ordered alimony on 
the 1st day of each month and is to continue said payment until April 30, 2007, at which time it 
shall cease unless earlier termination occurs by order of the Court or operation of law. 
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37. The Court concludes that alimony shall terminate upon cohabitation, remarriage, 
or death of the petitioner. 
38. The Court concludes that during the course of the marriage the parties incurred 
certain debts and obligations, which should be divided pursuant to provisions in the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
39. The Court concludes that the petitioner did purchase, in July of 2001, a 
condominium in West Jordan, Utah, that there is no equity of a monetary nature, and that 
petitioner is awarded the same free and clear of claim by respondent. 
40. The Court concludes that for the reasons set forth in its Findings of Fact, the 
respondent should immediately file an amended 2000 tax return and shall allocate all interest 
income deductions for mortgages and all refunds from state returns equally between the parties. 
41. The Court concludes that the petitioner is awarded the right to take her maiden 
name of Frank, if she so desires 
42. The Court concludes that each party should be responsible for and shall pay his or 
hers own attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this ff*~ day of January 2002. 
By the Court: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA SHAW, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SCOTT SHAW, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004907136 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
This matter having come on regularly for trial pursuant to Notice before the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henroid on October 29 and 30. 2001, Melissa J. Shaw appearing in person and 
represented by James I. Watts, and the respondent Scott Shaw appearing in person 
and represented by Richard G. Hackwell, the Court having received exhibits, taken testimony of 
the parties and their respective witnesses, received and heard the arguments of counsel, and 
otherwise being fully advised, does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE AS 
FOLLOWS: 
The Petitioner, Melissa Shaw, is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences and the marriage is hereby dissolved and the parties are 
hereby free and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony. 
The Court approves the parties' partial stipulation and orders as follows: 
Divorce Decree @J 
1. That all retirement accounts and pensions owned by the parties will be divided 
between them pursuant to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order, in accordance with the 
Woodward Formula. 
2. That this will include the Petitioner's and the Respondent's retirement accounts 
from Redrock Brewing Company and the Respondent's 401k, 457 or any other retirement 
account maintained through the State Retirement Systems Firefighter's Department. 
3. That the parties' marital residence located at 5349 S. Appian Way, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, is ordered be listed for sale at $160,000 and is to be sold. 
4. That the Respondent is awarded the use and possession of the residence during 
the pendency of the sale. 
5. That the Respondent is ordered not to make any alterations, modifications, or 
improvements to the home that would cost more than $100 without the specific authorization or 
approval of the Petitioner 
6. That any modifications or repairs made by him will be the Respondent's sole 
financial responsibility, unless such written approval is obtained in advance of making said 
improvements. 
7. The Petitioner and Respondent are ordered to cooperate in all respects in order to 
market the residence, to include if necessary, the placing a lock box on the residence to allow 
access at times when the Respondent is not otherwise able to be at the residence or would render 
the listing agent unable to show the residence. 
8. The Court orders that upon the sale of the residence, the respondent is to receive 
from the gross proceeds, the sum of $4,290 representing the down payment on the parties' first 
home, with the balance of the sale proceeds divided evenly with the following offsets and 
deductions: 
a) The Petitioner to receive from the Respondent's portion of the sales 
proceeds the following amounts: 
i. $3,750 ( V2 equity in the 1992 Ford Truck), 
ii. $4,424 ( Vi equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle). 
9. The Court awards to the Respondent the Marriott and the WorldMart timeshares 
subject to all indebtedness thereon. 
10. The Respondent is ordered to pay the debt secured by the timeshares holding the 
Petitioner harmless there from. 
11. The Court orders that each party is awarded any life insurance policy which the 
party presently maintains and may change the beneficiary as the party desires. 
12. The Court orders that an amended 2000 tax return be filed by the Respondent, 
and that the Respondent claim only one-half of the mortgage interest deductions, property taxes, 
and other deductions which should properly be allocated between the parties. 
13. The Court awards the Petitioner Vi of the equity in the 1992 Ford Truck, equal to 
the sum of $3,750; and, Vi of the equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, equal to the 
sum of $4,424, and is to be paid to her as ordered above. 
14. The Court orders that the personal property be awarded to the party in possession 
of the same with the exception of the following items which the Court orders be returned to the 
Petitioner: the skating rink Christmas decoration, the skinny Christmas tree, all ornaments with 
Jason's or her name on them, one of the Old-Time Santas, the mirror over the stairway, and the 
rug in the basement TV room. 
15. The Court orders alimony to be paid to the Petitioner by the Respondent in the 
sum of $250 per month commencing with the month of December 2001, and that said obligation 
should be paid to the Petitioner on the 1st day of each month. 
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16. The Court orders that upon the sale of the Appian Way residence, that alimony 
will be increased to $500 per month, without further court proceedings. 
17. The Court orders that alimony shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner for 
a period equal to the duration of the parties' marriage, and shall terminate on April 30, 2007. 
18. The Court orders that the alimony award shall terminate at an earlier date upon 
the cohabitation, remarriage, or death of the Petitioner. 
19. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the Discover Card 
balance. 
20. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the Granite Furniture 
account. 
21. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the R.C. Willey 
account. 
22. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the Lowe's account. 
23. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the Dell Computer 
account. 
24. The Court orders that the Petitioner is solely responsible for the obligation 
regarding the West Jordan condominium. 
25. The Court orders that the Respondent is solely responsible for the Discover Card 
in his name. 
26. The Court awards to the Petitioner her condominium in West Jordan Utah, free 
and clear of claim by Respondent. 
27. The Court orders that the Respondent is solely responsible for all financial 
obligations regarding the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle and the 1992 Ford Truck.. 
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28. The Court orders that the Petitioner is awarded the right to take her maiden name 
of Frank, if she so desires. 
29. The Court orders that each party is responsible for paying their own attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this if- day of January 2002. 
By the Court: 
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO: SCOTT SHAW 
Please take notice that the undersigned Attorney for Petitioner will submit the above and 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce to Judge Stephen L. 
Henroid for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days, plus three (3) days mailing, from 
the date this notice is mailed to you unless written objection is filed prior to that tine, pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration in the District Courts of the State of Utah. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this day of January 2002. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
•^M\ 
JAMES I. WATTS (4768) 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
OLD SALT LAKE STOCK & MINING BLDG. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel (801) 994-0838 
Fax (801) 994-0833 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C<^URT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA SHAW, 
I AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. 
I Civil No. 004907136 
SCOTT SHAW, 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S Objection to the form of the previously entered Decree of Divorce 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, having come before the Court; the Court having 
agreed to hear the matter via teleconference on January 29, 2002, at 2:00 p.m., the petitioner 
appearing by and through her attorney of record James I. Watts, the respondent appearing by and 
through his attorney of record, Gayanne Schmid, the Honorable Judge Stephen Henroid presided. 
The Court having heard the argument of counsel having received the objections and replies 
thereto and having made an oral ruling and attorney for petitioner being directed to prepare 
Amended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce memorializing 
the Court's ruling. Those Amended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, having been 
submitted to counsel for the respondent and the Court having reviewed the same, does now enter 
its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
,n 
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1. The Court finds that paragraph 69 of the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law as previously entered, should be amended as follows: 
2. The Court finds that the formula for calculating the petitioner's equity in the 2000 
Harley Davidson Motorcycle, awarded to the respondent, is as follows: $19,000 (value of 
motorcycle) - $5,542; payoff = $13,548 divided by 2 = $6,774 (parties' equity). From 
petitioner's equity, the sum of $4,700 is to be deducted, petitioner's net equity in respondent's 
motorcycle is the sum of $2,074 and the petitioner is awarded a judgment in said amount. 
3. Paragraph 36 of the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are amended to 
reflect that the Court finds the petitioner has paid the sum of $3,331 to Carpet One for the 
replacement of carpet in the home, and that the respondent has paid the sum of $2,203.83 for 
repairs to the residence and that each party is entitled to a return of those funds from the sale 
proceeds. 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having adopted the Amended Findings of Fact does now adopt its Amended 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. Paragraph 17 of the Conclusions of Law is amended as follows: The Court 
concludes that the petitioner has paid the sum of $3,331 to Carpet One of Salt Lake City, Utah 
for carpet replacement in the Appian Way home and that the respondent has paid, or been 
credited with, paying the sum of $2,203.83 in improving and repairing the home. 
2 
2. The Court concludes that the parties are entitled to be repaid those funds from the 
sale proceeds of the home which amounts were advanced by her or him for repairs in order to 
make the home more salable 
3. Paragraph 19 is amended to reflect that: The Court concludes that the petitioner is 
entitled to be paid from the respondent's portion of the sale proceeds of the marital residence, the 
sum of $2,074 representing Vi of the equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson, which the Court has 
awarded to the respondent. 
4. The Court concludes that all other remaining provisions of the previously entered 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are and remain the findings of facts and conclusions 
of the Court. 
DATED this I1] day of February 2002. 
By the Court: 
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JAMES I. WATTS (4768) JIM A G ^ D 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 u -*T 
OLD SALT LAKE STOCK & MINING BLDG. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel (801) 994-0838 
Fax (801) 994-0833 „/£W ^ ^ ^ / 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA SHAW, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SCOTT SHAW, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004907136 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
This matter having come on regularly for trial pursuant to Notice before the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henroid on October 29 and 30, 2001, Melissa J. Shaw appearing in person and 
represented by James I. Watts, and the respondent Scott Shaw appearing in person 
and represented by Richard G. Hackwell. The Court having entered a Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the form of which was objected to by the respondent 
and the Court having agreed to hear the matter via teleconference on January 29, 2002, the 
petitioner appearing by and through her attorney of record James I. Watts, the respondent 
appearing by and through his attorney of record Gayanne Schmid, the Honorable Judge Stephen 
Henroid presiding, did hear the argument of counsel, did receive objections and replies thereto, 
and having made an oral ruling and the attorney for petitioner being directed to prepare Amended 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law memorializing the Court's ruling and amending the 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Court does now ORDER, ADJUDGE AND 
AMEND DECREE AS FOLLOWS: IllllllA^ffinlnill&HffHlTllllMIHWHIifif 
1. Paragraph 8(a) of the Decree of Divorce is amended to reflect the amount of the 
petitioner's equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle is the sum of $2,074. 
2. Paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce is amended as follows: The Court awards 
the petitioner lA of the equity in the 1992 Ford Truck, equal to the sum of $3,750; and, V2 of the 
equity in the 2000 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, equal to the sum of $2,074, and is to be paid to 
her as ordered above. 
3. The Court orders that each of the parties is entitled to be prepaid from the sales 
proceeds, the funds advanced by him or her to make repairs or improvements to the home in 
anticipation of sale. That the petitioner is to receive the sum of $3,331 and respondent is to 
receive the sum of $2,203.83. 
4. The Court orders that all other remaining provisions of the previously entered 
Decree of Divorce are and remain the orders of the Court. 
(4 DATED this day of February 2002. 
By the Court: 
TO: SCOTT SHAW 
Please take notice that the undersigned Attorney for Petitioner will submit the above and 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce to Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days, plus three (3) days mailing, from the date this 
notice is mailed to you unless written objection is filed prior to thatljne, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the 
Code of Judicial Administration in the District ComJ&j&fUhe-StaJ^ i Utah. Kindly govern yourself 
accordingly. 
DATED this X day of January 200 
< ^ . i 
UTAH RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who 
may be used at trial to present evidence under R u j e s 792 703 or 
705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected 
to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after 
the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the 
evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same 
subject matter identified by another part}7 under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 
days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground 
for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
UTAH CODE ANN SECTION 30-3-1 PROCEDURE --RESIDENCE --GROUNDS. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract 
between the petitioner and respondent on the grounds specified in 
Subsection 
(3) in all cases where the petitioner or respondent has been an 
actual and bona fide resident of this state and of the county 
where the action is brought, or if members of the armed forces of 
the United States who are not legal residents of this state, 
where the petitioner has been stationed in this state under 
military orders, for three months next prior to the commencement 
of the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent to 
marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent for 
more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent to 
the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to 
the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a 
decree of separate maintenance of any state for three 
consecutive years without cohabitation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 30-3-5 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY -
MAINTENANCE AND HEALTH CARE OF PARTIES AND 
CHILDREN -DIVISION OF DEBTS -COURT TO HAVE CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION - CUSTODY AND PARENT-TIME -DETERMINATION OF 
ALIMONY -NONMERITORIOUS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipients earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase 
in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, 
the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of 
the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-2a-3 COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies. 
UTAH EVIDENCE RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent 
from the context within which questions were asked. Once the court makes a 
definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or 
before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve 
a claim of error for appeal. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or 
asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
UTAH RULES EVIDENCE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
UTAH RULES EVIDENCE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness1 testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of the witness1 testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. 
UTAH EVIDENCE RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
UTAH EVIDENCE RULE 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at 
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
UTAH EVIDENCE RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA 
UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons 
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the 
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose 
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
